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ABSTRACT
Essays on Durations of War and Postwar Peace
by
Daina Chiba
This dissertation consists of three self-contained essays that investigate the dura-
tion of war and the duration of postwar peace. The first essay studies both durations
jointly, with a particular focus on the interdependence between the two processes. It
demonstrates that membership in security organizations can prolong the durability
of peace after conflict, but that the expected longer peace after conflict can also
prolong the duration of conflict. The second essay analyzes the duration of war in
a greater detail, exploring how third-party actors influence the process. It shows
that balanced intervention can shorten the duration until a negotiated settlement is
reached between the disputants. The third essay looks at the stability of postwar
peace by focusing on the strength of cease-fire agreements. It argues that stronger
agreements can maintain longer peace after wars by helping the disputants resolve
the bargaining problems. The statistical analysis that corrects for the endogeneity
of agreement strength provides support for the argument.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
During the Sri Lankan Civil War that lasted for over two decades, more than 55,000
people were killed in battles, 1 and countless more Sri Lankan people su↵ered signif-
icant hardships as a result of the environmental and economic damages caused by
the war. Large scale violence began in 1984 as an insurgency against the govern-
ment by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Intense fighting between the
government and the LTTE continued throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, killing
people in battles each year. After a number of failed attempts at peace talks over the
course of the conflict, a cease-fire was finally declared in December 2001. However, in
December 2005 the government and the LTTE resumed another large scale conflict
that has claimed more than 20,000 lives by the end of 2009.
These observations lead us to ask important questions: once a violent conflict
breaks out, how do we make the disputants stop fighting? Relatedly, once the dis-
putants reach a cease-fire, how do we prevent them from fighting again? Questions
of conflict termination and recurrence have been relatively understudied, as most of
the past research on violent conflict has been focused on the onset of a new conflict.
1 The death toll for the Sri Lankan Civil War is based on the Uppsala Con-
flict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset available online at
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp battle-related deaths dataset/ (accessed
on April, 2012.)
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However, the duration of conflict and the durability of post-conflict peace are also
important aspects of the conflict process. In this dissertation, I investigate these
related subjects in a series of three self-contained essays.
Why is it important to focus on conflict duration and post-conflict peace dura-
tion rather than conflict onset? To illustrate the empirical significance of continued
conflict and conflict recurrence, let me introduce three important patterns in violent
conflicts in the world. First, most armed conflicts we observe in the world are a
continuation of old conflicts rather than new onsets. Figure 1.1 shows the number
of armed conflicts fought in the world during the period of 1946–2009, taken from
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). 2 In this figure, the horizontal axis
shows the year of observation, and the height of the bars shows the number of civil
and international conflicts involving more than 25 battle deaths in a given year. The
gray bars at the bottom show the number of new onsets, whereas the black bars on
top of the gray bars show the number of continued conflicts from the previous years
(i.e., those conflicts that were initiated in previous years but were still ongoing in a
given year). We can see from this figure that, once a conflict breaks out, it tends to
linger.
In fact, some conflicts last for years. Figure 1.2 shows the duration of battles
for terminated conflicts. In this histogram, the horizontal axis shows the duration
measured in years, and the vertical axis shows the frequency (the number of termi-
nated conflicts that have certain durations). As we can see, even though the modal
duration is less than one year, a great number of conflicts have lasted for decades,
2 The UCDP data sets are available online at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/
(accessed on March, 2012.)
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Figure 1.1 : Global trend in armed conflict 1: new onset vs. ongoing
(Notes. This figure shows the number of armed conflicts observed in a given year, taken from the
UCDP data set. The gray bars show the number of armed conflicts initiated in a given year, and
the black bars show the number of armed conflicts that were initiated in previous years but were
still ongoing in a given year.)
sometimes more than 50 years.
Furthermore, even after one conflict was terminated, many of the disputants have
resumed fighting. In Figure 1.3, the horizontal axis shows the year of observation, and
the vertical axis shows the number of armed conflicts that are terminated in a given
year, taken from the UCDP data set. The black bars show the number of terminated
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Figure 1.2 : Global trend in armed conflict 2: duration of armed conflict
(Notes. This figure shows the histogram of observed conflict duration, taken from the UCDP data
set. The horizontal axis shows the duration measured in years, and the height of the bars shows
the number of terminated conflicts that have a given duration.)
conflicts that have recurred in less then 20 years after the termination, whereas the
gray bars show the number of terminated conflicts that have not recurred in 20 years.
We can see that, especially in recent years, more than half of the terminated conflicts
have recurred after the termination.3
3 Note that, for those recent conflicts that are terminated less than 20 years prior to 2009 (the
end of observation), the number of recurrence shown here is the lower limit : there may be
even more recurrences in the future.
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Figure 1.3 : Global trend in armed conflict 3: recurrence of armed conflict
(Notes. This figure shows the frequency of conflict recurrence, taken from the UCDP data set. The
height of the bars shows the number of armed conflicts terminated in a given year. The gray bars
show the number of terminated conflicts that have not recurred in 20 years after termination, and
the black bars show the number of terminated conflicts that have recurred in less than 20 years.)
These three patterns suggest that we as political scientists need to investigate the
causes of conflict duration and recurrence in order to better understand the conflict
process as a whole. A lot of research studies the onset of violent conflict, but this
is only a part of the picture. A great proportion of armed conflicts we observe are
either a continuation or a recurrence of old conflict.
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It is also normatively important to understand why some conflicts last as long
as they do, and what explains the durability of peace after a conflict is terminated.
The longer a conflict lasts, the more people will be killed, injured, or forced to
migrate. Moreover, wars divert valuable resources into fighting and economic growth
is reduced considerably. Military expenditures rise during a war and do not return
to normal levels years after the fighting ends. Even though post-conflict countries
experience economic recovery as a result of improved trade relationship and increased
growth, violent conflicts often recur. Understanding the causes of conflict duration
and recurrence will help us prescribe a policy to address these phenomena. In the
remainder of this chapter, I lay out my plan of investigation for the following three
substantive chapters as well as the intended contribution of the dissertation.
1.1 Plan
In the first essay (Chapter 2), I investigate the e↵ect of some contextual factors that
are relatively constant over time on durations of conflict and post-conflict peace.
More specifically, I look at how joint membership in security organizations influences
the disputants’ ability to terminate conflict and maintain post-conflict peace. I argue
that membership in security organizations can improve the enforcement conditions
after conflict, and thereby prolong the durability of peace after conflict. This is
because these organizations have the ability and willingness to punish a unilateral
violation of a cease-fire by a member state, which increases the disputants’ expecta-
tion that the terms of peace they agree to will be long-lasting. However, precisely
because of the expected longer peace after conflict, the disputants that have mem-
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bership in such organizations will have greater incentives to fight longer in order to
get better terms of peace, thereby prolonging the duration of conflict as well. Ana-
lyzing data on durations of conflict and post-conflict peace from 1918 to 2004, I find
empirical support for my hypotheses.
While working on the first essay, I came across some additional questions and
puzzles, which motivated my two other essays. That is, even though contextual
factors such as institutional membership may have unfortunate conflict-prolonging
e↵ect, the international community need not just sit back and let the disputants fight.
In fact, the international community sometimes seeks to intervene in an ongoing
conflict in order to shorten conflict duration. Moreover, the disputants themselves
would also want to react and to try to reduce conflict duration or to prolong the
durability of peace after conflict. Accordingly, the second and the third essays look
at factors that are changing over time possibly because of the strategic interactions
between political actors.
The second essay (Chapter 3) looks at the e↵ect of third-party actors on the
duration of conflict. Specifically, I look at the e↵ect of third-party interventions on
the duration and outcome of civil wars. By employing a research design that takes
into account the strategic dependence between multiple duration processes, I reveal a
conflict-reducing e↵ect of some kinds of external interventions in civil wars. Contrary
to the conventional wisdom that interventions tend to prolong civil war, the results
show that balanced interventions can shorten the duration of wars until a negotiated
settlement is reached between the government and the rebel group.
The third essay (Chapter 4) looks at the e↵ort of the disputants to stabilize peace
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after conflict. One of the policy measures that disputants can use to prevent recur-
rence of wars is to sign strong cease-fire agreements at war’s end. However, there
is no consensus in the literature that suggests that such agreements are e↵ective in
promoting peace after wars. So, the research question I am addressing in the third
essay is: Can strong cease-fire agreements maintain peace after war? I argue and
demonstrate with evidence that agreement strength is endogenous to the baseline
prospect for peace. That is, disputants tend to sign stronger agreements in tougher
cases. This endogeneity problem is one of the reasons why past studies have not
found a robust relationship between agreement strength and post-war peace dura-
tion. Moreover, I show that, once we correct for the endogeneity, stronger cease-fire
agreements indeed keep peace longer after wars. The finding that states can sign
stronger peace agreements to lower the danger of war recurrence should be very en-
couraging to policy makers who are concerned with conflict management. If well
designed agreements can enhance the prospect for peace even under di cult circum-
stances, then it provides policy makers with an e↵ective and low-cost policy measure
to deal with this problem.
The dissertation as a whole makes a contribution to the literature on violent
conflict by revealing several exciting dynamics that have not been appreciated in past
studies. Moreover, it also shows the importance of designing appropriate statistical
tests that incorporate strategic interactions between political actors. In each of the
three essays, I propose new statistical models that are specifically designed to address
the empirical challenges I face. With these models, I o↵er a number of policy-relevant
findings.
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International Organizations and the Durations of
International Conflict and Post-conflict Peace
Chapter Abstract
How do international organizations (IOs) influence states’ conflict behavior in the ab-
sence of centralized enforcement? This study develops and tests a theory about how
IO membership helps solve the enforcement problems states face in the aftermath of
a militarized conflict. It argues that joint membership in IOs that explicitly promote
peaceful settlement of disputes improves enforcement conditions by increasing the
costs of cease-fire violation in the long run. As a result, these IOs make a cease-fire
more durable once the disputants agree to stop fighting. However, precisely because
they expect longer peace after conflict, the member states have incentives to adopt
tougher bargaining positions during conflict, causing a delay in reaching a cease-fire.
A survival analysis that recognizes the interdependence between the durations of
conflict and subsequent peace demonstrates that IO membership lengthens both the
duration of conflict and the duration of subsequent peace.
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2.1 Introduction
There has been a growing body of research on the relationship between international
organizations (IOs) and militarized interstate conflict. Many researchers have con-
cluded that joint membership in IOs makes the onset of militarized conflict less likely.
Nevertheless, there have been numerous violent conflicts fought between countries
that belong to the same IOs. Despite its prevalence, less attention has been devoted
to the potential e↵ects of IOs on conflict that has already been initiated. Do IOs
reduce the recurrence of conflict between member states? If so, how does this in-
fluence the disputants’ behavior during conflict? This study develops and tests an
argument about how IO membership influences the disputants’ ability to reach and
maintain a durable cease-fire agreement after conflict has begun.
Applying a model of bargaining and enforcement of international agreements
to the case of cease-fire cooperation, I argue that IOs have two e↵ects: they can
make a cease-fire agreement more durable, but more di cult to achieve in the first
place. More specifically, membership in IOs with a security mandate and resources
to intervene can improve the enforcement conditions by making it more costly for
the ex-belligerents to violate a cease-fire agreement. However, precisely because they
expect longer peace after conflict, member states of these IOs will have incentive to
hold out longer in conflict in hopes of obtaining better terms of a cease-fire, causing
a delay in agreement.
To evaluate these predictions empirically, I develop a statistical model that rec-
ognizes that the duration of conflict and the durability of peace after conflict are
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a jointly determined outcome of international bargaining. The theoretical model
suggests that the processes of bargaining and enforcement are interdependent, which
means that the durations of militarized conflict and post-conflict peace are correlated.
I use a copula function to characterize the joint distribution of the two correlated du-
ration variables. Survival analysis of the data on conflict termination and recurrence
from 1918 to 2004 provides support for the predictions.
The paper proceeds by laying out a theoretical argument about the e↵ects of
IO membership on the delay and durability of a cease-fire agreement in militarized
conflict. The following section introduces the data and develops a research design to
test the hypotheses. I then present the empirical findings. The final section concludes
by discussing policy implications and the directions for future research.
2.2 IOs and Interstate Conflict
Scholars of international relations have devoted significant attention to the relation-
ship between international institutions and militarized conflict. Earlier studies have
reported that pairs of countries that share more memberships in IOs are less likely
to become involved in militarized conflict (Oneal & Russett 1999, Oneal, Russett
& Berbaum 2003, Russett & Oneal 2001, Russett, Oneal & Davis 1998). Subse-
quent studies have tried to provide specific causal mechanisms of conflict reduc-
ing e↵ect of the IOs by drawing on bargaining theories (e.g. Boehmer, Gartzke &
Nordstrom 2004). Bargaining models of war posit that militarized conflict occurs
when bargaining fails to produce a more favorable outcome than war, and conflict is
terminated when the disputant states reach some agreement that is better than con-
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tinued fighting (Fearon 1995, Powell 2002, Reiter 2009). Building on the bargaining
framework, recent empirical studies on IOs and conflict argue that joint membership
in IOs reduces conflict by helping states overcome obstacles related to the bargaining
process (Bearce & Omori 2005, Bearce, Floros & McKibben 2009, Boehmer, Gartzke
& Nordstrom 2004, Haftel 2007, Hansen, Mitchell & Nemeth 2008, Mitchell & Hensel
2007, Pevehouse & Russett 2006, Shannon 2009, Shannon, Morey & Boehmke 2010).
While these studies contribute to our understanding of conflict processes, they
have focused only on the onset, or the duration of conflict while ignoring what hap-
pens after the conflict is terminated. As a result, much remains to be learned about
the e↵ect of IO membership on the stability of peace after conflict. For example, does
the conflict-reducing e↵ect of IOs last after the fighting is terminated? If so, how does
that a↵ect states’ behavior during conflict? If state leaders are rational and forward-
looking, they will take into account what they think will happen in the future when
they make decisions about their current course of actions. In other words, factors
associated with the stability of post-conflict peace (such as IO membership) will also
influence how the disputants fight a conflict before a cease-fire is reached between
them. This calls into question the previous findings on IOs and conflict behavior
that failed to take into account the disputants’ expectation of future interaction.
In a similar vein, existing research on the duration of post-conflict peace has
not fully explored how some exogenous conditions influence both the durability
of a cease-fire and whether and when a cease-fire is achieved in the first place.
Previous studies have focused on the e↵ect of factors that are endogenously de-
termined during conflict, such as institutional strength of a cease-fire agreement
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(Fortna 2003, 2004), the amount of informational asymmetries reduced in the bat-
tle fields (Werner & Yuen 2005), international mediation (Beardsley 2008, Gartner
& Bercovitch 2006), types of political and military outcomes achieved by the dis-
putants (Senese & Quackenbush 2003, Quackenbush & Venteicher 2008), or victor-
imposed regime change at war’s end (Lo, Hashimoto & Reiter 2008). While these
factors are rightly of important considerations for scholars and practitioners of in-
ternational politics, they are a consequence, not cause, of the expected di culty
of enforcing a cease-fire agreement in a given environment. As a result, much still
remains to be learned about how the underlying enforcement conditions shape the
likelihood and success of cease-fire cooperation. The challenge here is that simply
looking for the correlates of successful enforcement of an agreement does not give us
much leverage in pinpointing the determinant of cooperation, because the disputant
states strategically choose whether and how to cooperate in the first place (Downs,
Rocke & Barsoom 1996).
I address this problem by applying a formal model of international cooperation
developed by Fearon (1998) that analyzes the bargaining process and the enforce-
ment of an agreement jointly. The model consists of the initial stage where states
bargain over the terms of cooperation, followed by the enforcement stage where states
implement the the agreed terms in the face of temptations to renege. The key fea-
ture of the model is that the (expected) durability of a cooperative agreement in the
second stage influences how long the states are willing to hold out in the first stage in
hopes of obtaining better terms of cooperation. Although the model is not directly
about militarized conflict, disputants in militarized conflict face similar incentives:
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the longer the disputants expect the cease-fire agreement to last, the longer they
are willing to fight in hopes of obtaining better terms of a cease-fire. Then, if joint
membership in IOs indeed makes post-conflict peace more stable, it may also have
an unfortunate e↵ect of prolonging conflict. Below, I discuss Fearon’s model in detail
and relate it to the specific subject of IO membership and cease-fire cooperation.
2.3 IOs, Bargaining, and Enforcement
The game captures strategic interaction between two states, 1 and 2, fighting over
some flow of benefit worth one to each side per unit of time. As the states incur
per-unit-time costs of conflict ( ci, i = 1, 2) while fighting, they have incentive to
agree on a cease-fire and split the disputed good according to some division. But,
the disputants disagree over how to divide the disputed good. In addition, the
anarchic nature of the international system allows either state to deviate from the
agreed division, even if it is reached in bargaining. Therefore, the disputants face two
distinct problems as they go through two consecutive stages. In the initial bargaining
stage, they must agree on which of the potential cease-fire agreements to implement
after they stop fighting. In the subsequent enforcement stage, they must ensure that
the agreed deal is implemented in the face of temptations to renege. In the following
two sections, I discuss each of the two stages and derive testable hypotheses based on
the model’s comparative statics. The two stages are analyzed in the backward order
because the disputants’ bargaining behaviors in the initial stage are determined by
their anticipation of what will happen after they agree to stop fighting.
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IOs and Enforcement of a Cease-fire
The enforcement stage begins when the disputants reach some agreement about the
division of the disputed good. Let x 2 [0, 1] be such an agreement that gives x to
state 1 and 1   x to state 2 per unit of time. The two states now face the problem
of ensuring compliance with x by both sides. If both sides deviate from the agreed
cease-fire, they go back to the bargaining stage, where neither gets the disputed
good and both pay the costs of conflict, ci. If one state deviates from the agreement
while the other state complies with it, the defector can get a payo↵ greater than the
agreement payo↵ (a > x and a > 1 x). The compliant state is assigned the “sucker”
payo↵ ( b <  ci) during this period, giving it incentive to defect as well. Therefore,
a unilateral defection is profitable for the defector as long as the other state does not
respond with retaliatory defection in future rounds for some period of time. Such
a delay in response is captured by a response delay parameter,   > 0, such that
if one state unilaterally defects at time t, the other state is unable to detect or to
respond to this defection until t + . Table 2.1 describes the per-unit-time payo↵s
of the enforcement stage, where states choose between C (comply) or D (defect).
As this game is played continuously over time, the disputants evaluate streams of
future per-unit-time payo↵s according to a constant discount rate r > 0, meaning
that receiving x over d consecutive units of time into the future is worth e rdx now.
Smaller discount rates indicate that states discount future payo↵s less, making the
shadow of the future longer.
A cease-fire agreement is upheld in the enforcement stage as long as both sides can
make a credible threat of retaliation. It is the disputants’ ability and willingness to
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State 2
C D
State 1 C (x, 1  x) ( b, a)
D (a,  b) ( c1, c2)
Table 2.1 : Per-unit-time payo↵s of enforcement stage
punish a unilateral defection that guarantees mutual compliance with the cease-fire.
To see this more precisely, Fearon (1998) shows that a simple and severe grim-trigger
enforcement scheme can maintain cooperation when the following condition holds:
r   min
n
ln
a+ c1
a  x , ln
a+ c2
a  (1  x)
o
. (2.1)
This condition suggests that an agreement is easier to enforce the longer the shadow
of the future (smaller r); the quicker the detection of a unilateral defection (smaller
 ); the lower the per-unit-time benefit of unilateral defection (smaller a); the greater
the costs of non-agreement (greater ci).
I argue that membership in IOs improves the enforcement condition in the con-
text of cease-fire cooperation by extending the shadow of the future. The shadow
of the future is interpreted as players’ assessment of the probability of continued
interaction under the same payo↵ structure, or how much values players assign to
future payo↵s.1 Longer shadows of the future make it more costly for the states
to defect unilaterally from the agreed cease-fire, because the opponent can more
1 Having longer shadow of the future is equivalent to having smaller r, or lower discount rate.
Bearce, Floros & McKibben (2009) and Mitchell & Hensel (2007) make a similar assumption
in their analyses of IO membership and international cooperation.
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credibly threaten to punish the defection in future rounds of interactions.2 The im-
proved prospect for enforcement, in turn, further extends the shadow of the future
by encouraging the states to weigh future payo↵s more relative to present payo↵s.
How does joint participation in IOs extend the shadow of the future of member
states? First, an important aspect of membership in IOs is that it fosters an ex-
pectation that the member states will interact with each other for a very long time.
Unless states have some intention to continue interacting with other members, they
will not form or join an IO in the first place. In addition, some IOs are equipped with
institutional devices to make unilateral violation of a cease-fire less attractive even in
the short run, which will in turn stabilize the relationship in the long run. Although
many IOs have been created in hopes of promoting peace, not all institutions have
a security mandate and resources to help states enforce the agreed cease-fire. I thus
focus on pacific settlement IOs, defined as international institutions (including both
intergovernmental organizations and multilateral treaties) that call for peaceful set-
tlement of disputes among members (Hensel 2005). 3 It is these IOs that can monitor
compliance behavior with respect to the agreed cease-fire, facilitate communication
among the ex-belligerents, and increase opportunity costs of conflict.
There are numerous historical case examples where pacific settlement IOs take
2 Of particular importance here is the stability of payo↵ ordering between b and ci. This is
because the credibility of enforcement threats depends on the willingness of the other state to
bear the costs of mutual defection ( b <  ci) in case a unilateral defection is detected.
3 The analysis below thus excludes institutions that are primarily about economic cooperation, or
other non-security issues. There have been 51 pacific settlement IOs in the world. Examples of
these institutions include global IOs, such as the United Nations, and Non-aligned Movement,
as well as regional institutions, such as the African Union, League of Arab States, and the
Organization of the American States.
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proactive actions to help disputants enforce a cease-fire. For example, in the 1991
crisis in Yugoslavia, a handful of international organizations, including the United
Nations (UN), the European Community (EC), Conference for Security & Coopera-
tion in Europe, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), were involved in
the cease-fire process. After several violations of the cease-fire agreements brokered
by these IOs, the UN, EC, and NATO imposed economic sanctions and launched
air strikes on Yugoslavia to enforce the peace agreement (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott
& Oegg 2007, Woodward 1995). Regional IOs outside the Europe have also been
actively involved in the conflict management processes in disputes between their
member states. For example, the League of Arab States (LAS) was highly involved
in the war between North and South Yemen in 1979. The mediation e↵orts spon-
sored by the LAS culminated in a cease-fire between the disputants on March 3,
1979. As fighting continued despite the cease-fire agreement, on the 5th, the LAS
further adopted a resolution to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire and
the process of normalizing relations between the disputants. Then, the withdrawal
of the troops by both sides was completed in several days under the auspices of the
LAS (Bidwell 1983).
In addition to these instances where actions of IOs were directly observable, there
are many more instances where pacific settlement IOs exercise an implicit pressure
on the member states. Recent formal works show that IOs may be able to influence
states’ conflict behavior even when they are not directly involved in the dispute
processes (e.g. Fang 2010). Moreover, because of the explicit treaty obligation to
resolve their disputes peacefully, member states of these IOs find it more costly to
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make a credible threat to revise the status quo distribution of benefit with force,
which adds an additional stability to the agreed terms of a cease-fire. I expect that
the greater the number of pacific settlement IOs that the disputants both belong
to, the greater these e↵ects will be. This logic suggests that membership in pacific
settlement IOs has an e↵ect of stabilizing the peace after a conflict is terminated
between member states.
Hypothesis 1 (IO e↵ect in the enforcement stage) The disputants will have a longer du-
ration of peace after a termination of militarized conflict when they share
memberships in more IOs that explicitly promote pacific settlement of con-
flicts among member states.
IOs and Bargaining for a Cease-fire
Although pacific settlement IOs make a cease-fire agreement more durable in the
long run, improved enforcement can also make a cease-fire agreement more di cult
to achieve. In other words, when states anticipate that they will be stuck with the
agreed terms for a long time, they have incentive to fight longer to obtain better terms
of a cease-fire before agreeing to it. This can result in a costly delay in a cease-fire.
To explore the e↵ect of longer shadows of the future on the disputants’ incentive
to terminate conflict, I now turn to the initial bargaining stage that precedes the
enforcement stage.
Prior to the enforcement stage, the states are in dispute over two possible deals
(divisions of the disputed good) that both parties prefer to continued fighting. The
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problem is that the disputants disagree over which one to implement in the subse-
quent enforcement stage. Denote State i’s preferred division by xi 2 [0, 1], where
x1 > x2. I assume that the two feasible divisions are fixed for reasons exogenous to
the model, such that it is prohibitively costly for the disputants to come up with a
new o↵er. The disputants resolve this disagreement by playing a continuous time
war-of-attrition game where the player who quits fighting first has to concede the
preferred division to the other.
A pure strategy for state i is the quit time ti   0 that specifies how long it
will hold out in hope of getting the better agreement. When either state quits
fighting, a cease-fire agreement is struck, and the states move to the enforcement
game where the winner’s preferred division is implemented. For example, if t1 >
t2, the enforcement game begins at time t2 with per-unit-of-time payo↵s of mutual
compliance is (x1, 1   x1). While fighting, states incur per-unit-time costs of non-
agreement, ci > 0, the magnitude of which determines the relative power of states
on the disputed issue. That is, states with smaller ci will be willing to fight longer
for a better deal, on average. Ex ante, the states do not know who is stronger (have
lower costs of non-agreement) and thus willing to hold out longer in bargaining. 4
However, after they enter into a costly war of attrition, the states can credibly signal
their “strength” by bearing the costs of non-agreement. Fearon (1998) shows that
in a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in the bargaining phase, the ex ante expected
4 Fearon (1998) specifies that the states know their own costs, but that they know only the dis-
tribution of their opponent’s costs. For convenience, it is assumed that the costs are randomly
drawn from uniform distributions on the interval [1, 2].
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time until agreement is 5
t¯ =
ln 8  1
r
' 1
r
. (2.2)
This means that the longer the shadow of the future (smaller r), the longer the
duration of costly conflict until agreement will be.
While condition (2.1) suggests that the longer shadow of the future facilitated
by IO membership contributes to better prospect of enforcement, condition (2.2)
implies that it is a double-edged sword. If disputants expect more durable peace
after agreeing to terminate conflict, they have incentive to adopt tougher bargaining
strategies and hold out longer in conflict (the quit time t becomes greater) so as to
extract better terms of peace. On the other hand, if the disputants expect that post-
conflict peace will be fragile because of greater risk of changes in the payo↵ structure,
they will quickly terminate conflict with little intention to follow through on the
cease-fire agreement for very long. 6 I thus have the following testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 (IO e↵ect in the bargaining stage) The disputants will have a longer duration
of conflict when they share memberships in more IOs that explicitly promote
pacific settlement of conflicts among member states.
5 Fearon (1998) also solves the complete information version of the game. Although the structure
of the game is common knowledge, costly fighting occurs in equilibrium as states employ mixed
strategies.
6 Note that a mere expectation of future changes in the payo↵ structure can undermine mutual
compliance because of the “last-period e↵ect” in repeated games.
2.4. RESEARCH DESIGN 22
2.4 Research Design
To test the hypotheses, I analyze historical data on the duration of violent conflict
and the subsequent duration of peace after the termination of active fighting. These
two outcome variables are constructed using information from the International Crisis
Behavior (ICB) project. I use Hewitt’s (2003) dyadic version of the data set.7 The
initial analysis includes those crises that involve actual fighting, while excluding non-
violent crises.8 There are 435 crisis-dyads from 1918 to 2004, involving 234 unique
international crises. 9 All the crisis observations in the sample have been terminated
by the end of 2004.
I operationalize the first-stage outcome variable, duration of conflict until a cease-
fire agreement, as the time elapsed between the date of initiation and date of termina-
tion of international crises in a dyad. A “cease-fire” here does not necessarily mean a
complete resolution of the underlying contentious issues between the disputants nor a
formal armistice treaty signed by the disputants; it is simply defined as a cessation of
active fighting. Therefore, a cease-fire here can be informal (e.g., oral declaration or
tacit understanding). As long as neither side of the former belligerents is engaged in
active fighting, the disputants are considered to be in the post-conflict peace phase,
be it fragile and short-lived. This operationalization reflects the notion of coopera-
tion in the theoretical discussion above, where cooperation represents an absence of
7 I expanded the data set by adding newer ICB cases, based on the latest version of the actor-level
and crisis-level data (version 10, July 2010).
8 That is, I include those ICB crises that reach at least the second level of violence (“Minor
clashes”) in the ICB data set. I relax this assumption later in the paper.
9 There are several overlapping crises in the data set, where a next crisis begins before the previ-
ous one is terminated. In these cases, I combine the two crises into a single crisis observation.
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unilateral and mutual defection in the face of short-term benefit of reneging.
With this coding rule, there are 427 crisis-dyads where the disputants stop active
fighting and proceed to the post-conflict peace phase. In the remaining 8 (= 435 
427) cases, the defeated country ceases to exist as an independent state because of
annexation by the victor. 10 I treat these 8 observations as right-censored. That is,
I allow the “true” duration of conflict until a cease-fire (i.e., the duration that would
have been observed if the defeated state had not lost independence) for these cases
to be at least as long as the observed (censored) duration. 11 For the uncensored
427 observations, the duration of conflict ranges from 1 to 1, 462 days in the sample,
with median 110 and mean 198 days.
The second-stage outcome variable, the durability of enforcement phase following
a cease-fire agreement, is operationalized as the time elapsed between the termination
and recurrence of international crisis in a dyad. Among those 427 post-crisis-dyad
observations, a crisis has recurred in 168 cases (39.3%), for which the uncensored
duration of post-conflict peace is fully observed. Since post-conflict peace has not
broken down in the remaining 259 post-crisis-dyads as of 2004, the peace duration
for these cases is treated as right-censored at the end of 2004. Uncensored duration
of post-conflict peace is highly skewed to the right, ranging from 8 to 17, 916 days
(49 years), with a median of 1, 473.5 days (4 years) and a mean of 2, 825 days (8
years). To incorporate time-varying covariates, those crisis-dyads and post-crisis-
dyads that span multiple years are duplicated accordingly, yielding a total of 675
10 All of these incidences are from the crises that happened during the Second World War.
11 Alternatively, I also run all the analyses below by dropping these 8 observations entirely from
the data set. The results are qualitatively the same.
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crisis-dyad-year observations for conflict duration and 7, 706 observations for peace
duration.
Explanatory Variables
Data on the key explanatory variable, membership in pacific settlement IOs, are
taken from the Multilateral Treaties of Pacific Settlement (MTOPS) data set of the
Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project (Hensel 2005). The MTOPS data set con-
tains annual observations of state membership in qualifying IOs from 1816 to 2004.
To be qualified as such, pacific settlement IOs must call explicitly for peaceful settle-
ment of disputes among signatories, rather than simply mentioning the desirability
of peace. The MTOPS data set is limited to those IOs that have more than five
member states. To capture the e↵ects of IO membership on the disputants’ shadow
of the future, I count the number of shared membership in these IOs in a dyad.
The variable ranges from 0 to 11, with a median of 2. Table 2.6 lists all the Pacific
Settlement IOs included in the data analysis, and Figure 2.3 in Appendix 2 shows
the histogram of the IO membership variable.
I also include an interaction term between the IO membership and the analysis
time, which allows for the e↵ects of IO membership to change over time. This is
to account for the disputants’ diminishing uncertainty about each other’s resolve to
bear the costs of conflict. In the initial phase of conflict, there is much to learn about
the other side’s private information about their resolve to bear the costs of conflict.
In fact, this uncertainty about each other’s costs of conflict is the very reason they
enter the conflict in the first place. Fighting allows the disputants to learn about each
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other’s private information, and to update their beliefs accordingly (Slantchev 2003).
As time goes by, however, the amount of additional information to be learned will
necessarily shrink. This is where the expectation of the future begins to loom large.
Therefore, IO membership will have greater e↵ect in the later phases of conflict when
the information asymmetries are relatively leveled down.
A set of control variables that may confound the relationship between IO mem-
bership and conflict are also included in the analysis. Contiguity is a binary indicator
measuring whether or not the disputants share borders; Major Power takes the value
of 1 if a crisis-dyad involves at least one major power; Capability Balance is the ratio
of the stronger state’s military capability over the sum of capabilities in a dyad; Joint
Democracy is a binary variable coded as 1 if both states in a dyad have a 6 or higher
polity score (democracy minus autocracy score), and 0 otherwise; and the Year of
Initiation measures the year in which the crisis breaks out. 12
Statistical Model
In order to conduct a systematic analysis of the data, we need a statistical model that
can appropriately capture the theoretical insight of Fearon’s (1998) formal model
that the duration of conflict and the duration of peace are a jointly determined
outcome of bargaining. The model shows that enforcement conditions a↵ect not
only how long the agreed cease-fire will last once it is reached but also how long the
disputants are willing to hold out before a cease-fire. Then, if some unmeasurable
enforcement conditions influence both processes, the “residual” duration of conflict
12 Data on Contiguity, Major Power, and Capability Balance are taken from the Correlates of
War data set. Data on democracy score is from the Polity IV data set.
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(conflict duration conditional upon all the observables) will be correlated with the
residual duration of peace. For example, suppose some dyads have shorter shadows
of the future than other dyads, because of some unmeasurable variables. Conditions
(2.1) and (2.2) imply that these dyads would experience shorter delays in reaching
an agreement, but the post-conflict peace in these dyads would necessarily be fragile.
This yields a positive correlation between the two residual durations. Similarly, a
failure to measure and control for costs of conflict generates a negative correlation
in the error term. 13 To the extent that common unmeasured factors systematically
influence both bargaining and enforcement stages, analyzing one stage while ignoring
another will lead to bias in our inferences about the determinants of both processes. 14
To cope with this, I construct a unified statistical model of bargaining and en-
forcement that controls for unobservable enforcement conditions influencing the delay
and durability of a cease-fire agreement. The proposed solution is to jointly estimate
the durations of conflict and post-conflict peace while accounting for the correlation
between the two. The model is a generalization of the parametric univariate dura-
tion model in the sense that it can readily resolve the issues of right-censoring and
duration dependence as in other duration models.
Let i = 1, . . . , n denote a pair of states in a crisis, the observation unit I call crisis-
dyad. The goal is to make inferences about the duration of the initial bargaining
13 Some dyads with unobserved greater costs of non-agreement should experience shorter dura-
tions of conflict and longer durations of post-conflict peace, on average, than other dyads with
similar observable characteristics.
14 Furthermore, there may be some factors outside the theoretical model that cause a correlation
between the two durations. For example, the war-weariness argument suggests that there will
be longer peace after longer conflicts because the disputants become weary of wars after a long
fighting.
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stage, or time until crisis-dyad i agree to stop fighting, Tci, and the duration of peace
enforcement stage, or time until crisis-dyad i resumes conflict after a cease-fire, Tpi.
For crisis-dyads where a cease-fire agreement is reached, we observe the actual value
of tci as a realization of the underlying random variable Tci. For right-censored cases,
we only observe the right-censoring point, t0ci. I define a binary cease-fire indicator,
Ai, that takes on the value of 1 in crisis-dyads with a cease-fire, and 0 in the right-
censored crisis-dyads. Then, for crisis-dyads where a cease-fire is reached and post-
agreement peace has failed by the end of observation period, we observe the actual
value of peace duration tpi as a realization of the underlying random variable Tpi.
For crisis-dyads where crisis was terminated and post-conflict peace has not failed
yet, we only observe the right-censoring point, t0pi. I define another binary indicator,
Bi, that takes on the value of 1 in post-agreement crisis-dyads with recurrence, and
0 otherwise.
With these notations, the likelihood function is given as follows:
L =
nY
i=1
Pr(Tci > t
0
ci)
(1 Ai) Pr(Tci = tci \ Tpi > t0pi)Ai(1 Bi) Pr(Tci = tci \ Tpi = tpi)AiBi .
(2.3)
The first component of the likelihood function, Pr(Tci > t0ci), represents the likelihood
contribution from observations that are right-censored during the conflict phase, the
second component, Pr(Tci = tci\Tpi > t0pi), corresponds to those observations that are
right-censored during the peace phase after the disputants reached an agreement to
stop fighting. The last component, Pr(Tci = tci \ Tpi = tpi), is for those observations
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where disputants reach an agreement once and then fighting resumes.
To specify the likelihood function (2.3), I begin by characterizing the univariate
marginal distribution of the two random variables, Tci and Tpi. I allow the dura-
tions of conflict and peace to be conditioned on vectors of covariates, zci and zpi,
respectively. Then the hazard rates governing the two durations are specified as
 ci = exp( zci c) for conflict duration and  pi = exp( zpi p) for peace duration,
where  c and  p are vectors of the coe cient parameters. Using the flexible Weibull
specification, the univariate density function f(t), the survivor function S(t), and the
distribution function F (t) are each given as a function of   and the shape parame-
ter  . 15 The shape parameter determines whether the risk of “failure” event (i.e.,
conflict termination in the bargaining stage or conflict recurrence in the enforcement
stage) is increasing (  > 1), decreasing (  < 1), or constant (  = 1) over analysis
time.
The challenge here is to characterize the joint distribution of two duration vari-
ables, which is necessary to specify the second and the third components of the
likelihood function (2.3). I utilize a copula function to derive a joint distribution
from the two univariate marginal distributions. A copula is a function that binds
together two or more univariate marginal distributions of known form to produce a
new joint distribution (Trivedi & Zimmer 2005). As we have two marginal distribu-
tions, the association between the two marginals is represented by a single association
15 I chose the Weibull model because of its flexibility and simplicity. One limitation of the
Weibull specification, however, is that it does not allow for non-monotonic change in hazard.
As a robustness check, I also estimate a log-logistic model that allows for non-monotonicity
(but does not allow for a monotonic increase) in hazard. Statistical results are qualitatively
the same, and Vuong’s (1989) test of non-nested models does not reject the null hypothesis
that the two models are equally good.
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parameter, ✓, which captures the correlation between the residual durations of con-
flict and subsequent peace. The appendix 1 provides the derivation of the statistical
model in greater details.
2.5 Estimation Results
Using the data described so far, I maximize the likelihood function (2.3) with respect
to the coe cient ( c,  p), the shape ( c,  p), and the correlation (✓) parameters
jointly in full information maximum likelihood. Table 2.2 reports the maximum like-
lihood estimates of each parameter. Since there are two dependent variables, there
are two sets of coe cients: in the top panel, the first numerical column shows the
estimates of the coe cients for the conflict duration ( c), and the second numerical
column shows those for the peace duration ( p). These coe cients are in the accel-
erated failure time metric, which means that positive estimates are associated with
longer durations and negative estimates are associated with shorter durations.
The second panel in the table shows the estimates of the auxiliary parameters.
The Weibull shape parameters for conflict ( c) and peace ( p) durations are greater
than (and statistically distinguishable from) 1. This indicates that the baseline haz-
ard of conflict termination and that of recurrence are both increasing over time.
The correlation parameter (✓) measures the interdependence between the two resid-
ual durations, and assumes values between  1 (perfect negative correlation) and
+1 (perfect positive correlation). The estimated ✓ is negative, and statistically dis-
tinguishable from zero. This result suggests that the residual durations of conflict
and post-conflict peace are negatively correlated. As discussed above, one possible
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explanation for a negative correlation is our inability to measure the costs of conflict.
[Table 2.2 About Here]
As for the e↵ects of IO membership variables on conflict and peace durations,
we obtain negative estimates for the raw IO variables and positive estimates for
the interaction terms between IO membership and the analysis time in both stages.
Since this is a non-linear model and there are interaction terms, it is not immediately
clear what these estimates mean substantively. I thus calculate and plot probabilities
of continued fighting and those of conflict recurrence for di↵erent values of the IO
variable and observation time, while setting all the other variables at their median
values. Figure 2.1 illustrates the estimated e↵ect of IO membership on the duration
of conflict. The horizontal axis shows time (measured in months) and the vertical axis
represents the survival probability of conflict, or the probability of continued fighting
beyond time t. Greater probabilities of conflict survival mean that the duration of
conflict is longer. The vertical ticks at the bottom of the graph show the observed
distribution of conflict in the data set. For this figure, I compare two values of the
IO membership variables. The first is 1, which corresponds to the case where the
disputants are members of one pacific settlement IO. The other is 3, which is the
case where disputants are members of three IOs. These values correspond to the
25th and 75th percentile values of the IO membership variable in the data set. The
curve in light gray shows the estimates when membership is set equal to 1, with 95
% confidence intervals, and the dark gray curve shows them when the membership
is 3. These curves show the estimated survivor function Pr(Tc > tc), conditional
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Figure 2.1 : Substantive e↵ects of IO membership on conflict duration
(Notes. This figure shows the estimated impacts of IO membership on conflict duration along with
95 % confidence bands. The vertical axis shows the predicted probabilities of continued fighting
beyond time = t, and the horizontal axes show the analysis time in months).
on 1, 000 simulated values of the parameters and substantively interesting covariate
profiles. 16
We can see form Figure 2.1 that the overall e↵ect of IO membership is to increase
the duration of conflict, lending support for Hypothesis 1. Membership in pacific
settlement IOs indeed makes a violent conflict more di cult to terminate. At the
same time, we can also see that, in the initial days of conflict (when t < 1.5 month),
the IO membership has a small negative impact on the probability of continued
fighting, but as time passes the e↵ect becomes positive and grows larger. This
16 Simulated parameters are generated by randomly drawing 1, 000 values from a multivariate
Normal distribution characterized by the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters and
the estimated variance-covariance matrix (King, Tomz & Wittenberg 2000).
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observed pattern is consistent with the following interpretation. First, members
of pacific settlement IOs have a better chance of terminating conflict in the very
initial phases of conflict where the disputants face greater uncertainties about the
likely outcome of conflict. This is perhaps because the informational gap between
the disputants is smaller among IO members than among non-members. However,
once a conflict “survives” the first two months or so, the informational asymmetry
between the disputants has already diminished through fighting. This is when the
disputants’ concerns about enforcement conditions in the future begin to dominate.
In other words, beyond this point, the improved enforcement conditions in the future
as a result of membership in pacific settlement IOs start to lead to longer conflict.
Figure 2.2 shows the estimated substantive e↵ects of IO membership on the dura-
bility of a cease-fire after a conflict. The vertical axis represents the estimated condi-
tional probabilities of conflict recurrence beyond time = t, given the median duration
of conflict. Smaller probabilities of conflict recurrence mean that the duration of post-
conflict peace is longer. Again, the curve in light gray corresponds to the case where
IO membership is 1, and the dark gray curve to the case where the membership is
3. The figure shows that an increase in IO membership decreases the probability of
recurrence, lending support for Hypothesis 2. We can also see that the pacifying ef-
fect of IO membership is initially small in the immediate aftermath of a conflict, but
it becomes greater over time. Specifically, the conflict reducing e↵ect is statistically
indistinguishable from zero in the first three or four years after the termination of
conflict, but it achieves statistical significance after that. 17
17 Although it appears that the confidence intervals of the two curves overlap in the first six
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Figure 2.2 : Substantive e↵ects of IO membership on peace duration
(Notes. This figure shows the estimated impacts of IO membership on post-conflict peace duration,
along with 95 % confidence bands. The vertical axes show the predicted conditional probabilities of
conflict recurrence beyond time = t, and the horizontal axes show the analysis time in years. The
vertical ticks at the bottom of the graph show the observed (i.e., uncensored) distribution of peace
duration in the data set).
Robustness Checks
The statistical findings provide evidence that the theorized causal mechanisms are
indeed at work in historical data. As a robustness check, I examine the sensitivity
of the initial results to several assumptions I make in analyzing the data. Table 2.3
reports results from four additional tests along with the baseline estimates discussed
above.
years or so, the di↵erence between the two curves is statistically distinguishable from zero
after about 3.5 years.
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[Table 2.3 About Here]
First, we will see the consequences of ignoring the correlation between the dura-
tions of conflict and peace. Column (1) in Table 2.3 shows the results from a naive
model that assumes independence between the conflict and peace durations. 18 Com-
pared with the interdependent model, the naive model fits the data poorly, as the
maximized log likelihood value from this model ( 4289) is significantly smaller than
that from the interdependent model ( 4188). 19 In addition, there are several major
di↵erences in direction, size, and the statistical significance of the estimates. For ex-
ample, the estimated Weibull shape parameter for the peace duration is smaller than
1 (indicating negative duration dependence) in the naive model, whereas it is greater
than 1 (indicating positive duration dependence) in the interdependent model. This
means that the naive model fails to capture the shape of underlying probability of
conflict recurrence trending over time.
Second, I consider the possibility that the observed conflict-prolonging e↵ect
and/or peace-stabilizing e↵ect of IOs depend on the types of international conflict
included in the sample. Some may argue that IO membership has little e↵ect on
serious conflict that involves large scale violence while it may a↵ect small scale dis-
putes involving verbal threats or non-violent displays of force. Column (2) in Table
2.3 shows the results from an analysis that focuses on conflicts that involve serious
military clashes. This model excludes those conflicts that do not reach the third
18 This is equivalent to estimating two duration models separately, one for conflict duration and
another for peace duration.
19 Akaike’s information criteria for the naive model and the interdependent model are 8613 and
8414, respectively, showing that the interdependent model is better.
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level of violence (“Serious clashes”) in the ICB data set. 20 The statistical results
show that the estimated values of the important parameters are qualitatively the
same as those obtained from the baseline model, indicating that the same dynamics
emerge even when we focus exclusively on high-intensity conflicts. I also consider the
possibility that excluding non-violent conflict biases the initial results. An analysis
shown under column (3) includes those conflicts that do not reach the second level
of violence (“Minor clashes”), along with more violent conflicts. Again, the results
are qualitatively the same as the original results. Model (4) looks at those conflicts
that occurred after the second World War to see if the findings are driven by the
existence of the United Nations. Once again, the estimation results underline the
same pattern.
Finally, I examine the threats to inference caused by potential sample selection
e↵ect. The set of international conflicts analyzed in this study may not be an appro-
priate sample to explore the e↵ects of IO membership on the durations of conflict and
post-conflict peace if there is a systematic relationship between IO membership and
conflict occurrence. To address the issue of nonrandom sample selection, I analyze a
three-stage model that incorporates the initial selection process into the interdepen-
dent duration model. For this analysis, we must first identify a set of observations
that are at risk of experiencing (but do not necessarily experience) militarized con-
flict. I consider all pairs of countries that have competing territorial claims with one
another, as identified by Huth & Allee (2002). Territorial disputes are particularly
20 The analysis thus includes the duration of conflict for 297 crisis-dyad observations and the
duration of subsequent peace for 289 post-crisis-dyad observations, which yields a total of
5, 907 time-varying observations.
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prone to escalate to violent conflict, but not all dyads with competing territorial
claims experience conflict. The data set spans the time frame from 1919 to 1995. In
this time period, there are 249 dispute-dyad observations, where an ICB crisis breaks
out in 131 of the cases.
The model’s first stage predicts the selection into conflict, which is specified as
duration of peace after the initiation date of territorial claims and before the outbreak
of violent conflict. 21 Once there is a conflict, the second stage predicts the duration
of conflict given selection, and the third stage predicts the duration of post-conflict
peace given selection and the duration of conflict. 22 The estimation is conducted by
combining two interdependent duration models. That is, I first estimate the initial
two stages jointly, and then estimate the latter two stages jointly by treating the
second stage estimates as given. Table 2.4 displays the estimation results.
[Table 2.4 About Here]
The estimated coe cients from the second and third stages show that IO mem-
bership has the hypothesized conflict-prolonging e↵ect and peace-stabilizing e↵ect
even after accounting for the selection into conflict. We can thus conclude that the
initial results are not an artifact of selection bias. Moreover, the estimated coe -
cients from the first stage show that IO membership has no discernible e↵ects on
21 Those dispute-dyads that do not experience violent conflict are treated as right-censored. There
are 118 (= 249  131) such observations in the data.
22 Although the other aspects of the research design are similar to the previous models discussed
above, there are several di↵erences in the measurement of covariates. First, the Year of Initi-
ation variable in this model measures the year in which the territorial claim begins. Second,
the cut point for the binary Joint Democracy in this model is 0, instead of 6. Since there are
not many democratic dyads that experience territorial claims, the variable has little variation
if we use 6.
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the duration of peace before conflict. In other words, IO membership does not seem
to be a good predictor of whether and when potential disputants experience violent
conflict.
2.6 Conclusion
States create a variety of international institutions to help them achieve cooperation
with other states in the absence of centralized enforcement. These institutions, once
in force, alter the strategic environment in which states interact with others. To
explore how IOs shape the member states’ conflict behavior, this study applies a
model of bargaining and enforcement to the case of cease-fire cooperation. The
theoretical discussion suggests that the conflict-reducing e↵ect of IOs manifests itself
after the conflict is terminated. It maintains that membership in IOs that have an
explicit obligation for member states to resolve disputes will make a conflict-ending
settlement more durable. But, the improved enforcement, in turn, can encourage
the disputants to stick to tougher bargaining positions, prolonging the duration of
costly fighting preceding a cease-fire. I evaluate these arguments empirically, and
find support for the hypotheses.
This research not only contributes to the scholarly debate about institutional
influence on states’ conflict behavior but also provides important implications for
policy makers. Given that the great proportion of international conflicts have been
fought between the same pairs of countries many times, the finding that IO member-
ship reduces conflict recurrence suggests that extending the membership in pacific
settlement IOs to these countries may be one way to address this problem. At the
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same time, we should also be aware of the danger in doing so. That is, if states
anticipate that they will be stuck with the agreed terms of peace in the long run
once they stop fighting, they have less incentive to terminate conflict. Once we rec-
ognize this trade-o↵, we can begin to think about possible ways to mitigate it. This
recognition becomes of critical importance when we are to evaluate the e↵ectiveness
of various policy tools, such as third-party mediation, that have received significant
attention in previous studies of militarized conflict. More specifically, research on
third-party conflict management will be benefitted by taking into account the dual
e↵ects of IO membership demonstrated in this study in order to devise an optimal
way to intervene in conflict.
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Table 2.2 : Maximum Likelihood Estimates from the Interdependent Duration Model
Conflict duration Peace duration
IO Membership  0.70⇤⇤  1.10⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.10)
IO Membership ⇥ log(time) 0.18⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤
(0.007) (0.02)
Capability Balance 0.29⇤⇤ 0.60
(0.11) (0.57)
Contiguity  0.32⇤⇤  0.46⇤⇤
(0.10) (0.17)
Major Power  0.41⇤⇤  0.02
(0.10) (0.20)
Joint Democracy  0.18 0.46
(0.25) (0.48)
Year of Initiation  0.01⇤⇤  0.01⇤
(0.002) (0.004)
Constant 5.33⇤⇤ 9.02⇤⇤
(0.13) (0.49)
Weibull shape parameter ( ) (a) 1.23⇤⇤ 1.21⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.08)
Correlation parameter (✓) (b)  0.21⇤⇤
(0.02)
Number of observations 435 427
Number of uncensored obs. 427 168
Time-varying observations 675 7706
Total number of obs. 7954
(Notes. As coe cients are shown in the accelerated failure time metric, positive coe cient estimates
are associated with longer duration and negative ones are associated with shorter duration. Standard
errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ⇤ : 5% ⇤⇤ : 1%, two-tailed tests).
(a) The Weibull shape parameters ( ) only take positive values. The null hypothesis in testing the
significance of   is   = 1.
(b) The correlation parameter (✓) takes values between  1 and +1.
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Table 2.3 : Robustness checks
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict duration
IO Membership  0.70⇤⇤  0.66⇤⇤  0.97⇤⇤  0.75⇤⇤  0.67⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
IO Membership ⇥ log(time) 0.18⇤⇤ 0.15⇤⇤ 0.21⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤ 0.17⇤⇤
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
Capability Balance 0.29⇤⇤ 0.08 0.07 0.34⇤⇤ 0.10⇤⇤
(0.11) (0.28) (0.05) (0.02) (0.004)
Contiguity  0.32⇤⇤  0.34⇤⇤  0.14  0.37⇤⇤  0.20⇤⇤
(0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
Major Power  0.41⇤⇤  0.40⇤⇤  0.43⇤⇤  0.39⇤⇤  0.14⇤⇤
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.01)
Joint Democracy  0.18 0.15 0.75⇤⇤  0.09  0.41
(0.25) (0.23) (0.02) (0.11) (0.25)
Year of Initiation  0.01⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 5.33⇤⇤ 5.66⇤⇤ 5.55⇤⇤ 5.21⇤⇤ 5.37⇤⇤
(0.13) (0.25) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Weibull shape parameter ( ) 1.23⇤⇤ 1.26⇤⇤ 1.49⇤⇤ 1.19⇤⇤ 1.20⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
Peace duration
IO Membership  1.10⇤⇤  0.71⇤⇤  1.44⇤⇤  1.16⇤⇤  1.05⇤⇤
(0.10) (0.19) (0.20) (0.07) (0.11)
IO Membership ⇥ log(time) 0.18⇤⇤ 0.11⇤⇤ 0.22⇤⇤ 0.19⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Capability Balance 0.60 0.21 0.43 0.57 0.14
(0.57) (0.73) (0.81) (0.42) (0.66)
Contiguity  0.46⇤⇤  1.017⇤⇤  0.54⇤⇤  0.51⇤⇤  0.43⇤
(0.17) (0.25) (0.25) (0.13) (0.18)
Major Power  0.02  0.48  0.07  0.18  0.22
(0.20) (0.27) (0.29) (0.15) (0.23)
Joint Democracy 0.46 0.70 0.35  0.01 0.41
(0.48) (0.54) (0.73) (0.26) (0.49)
Year of Initiation  0.01⇤⇤  0.001⇤  0.01  0.004  0.02⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.03) (0.005)
Constant 9.02⇤⇤ 10.15⇤⇤ 9.58⇤⇤ 8.61⇤⇤ 9.55⇤⇤
(0.49) (0.49) (0.71) (0.36) (0.59)
Weibull shape parameter ( ) 1.21⇤⇤ 0.79⇤⇤ 1.20⇤ 1.20⇤⇤ 1.29⇤⇤
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.06) (0.10)
Correlation parameter (✓)  0.21⇤⇤ 0  0.18⇤⇤  0.19⇤⇤  0.23⇤⇤
(0.02) (assumed) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
N: Conflict duration 435 435 297 595 336
N: Peace duration 427 427 289 586 336
N: Total 7954 7954 5907 9483 5959
Log likelihood  4188  4289  2618  6231  3270
(0) The baseline model, as shown in Table 2.2.
(1) A naive model, where the two durations are assumed independent.
(2) Analyzing conflicts that involve serious clashes.
(3) Including non-violent conflicts.
(4) Post-1945 conflicts only.
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Table 2.4 : Interdependent Duration Analysis with Selection
1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage
(Peace before conflict) (Conflict duration) (Peace after conflict)
IO Membership  0.45  0.64⇤⇤  0.77⇤⇤
(0.28) (0.06) (0.18)
IO Membership ⇥ log(time) 0.05 0.11⇤⇤ 0.12⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Capability Balance 2.14⇤ 2.28⇤⇤  0.94
(1.09) (0.59) (0.85)
Contiguity  1.57⇤⇤  0.61⇤⇤ 0.09
(0.49) (0.23) (0.40)
Major Power  0.51  0.58⇤⇤  0.01
(0.40) (0.19) (0.33)
Joint Democracy 1.84⇤⇤ 0.89⇤ 2.09†
(0.57) (0.35) (1.09)
Year of Initiation 0.004  0.01⇤⇤ 0.001
(0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
Constant 8.56⇤⇤ 4.58⇤⇤ 8.78⇤⇤
(0.96) (0.43) (0.72)
Weibull shape parameter ( ) 0.62⇤⇤ 1.26⇤⇤ 1.32⇤⇤
(0.06) (0.12) (0.15)
Correlation parameter (✓) (a) 0.45⇤⇤  0.15⇤⇤
(0.14) (0.04)
Number of Observations 249 131 113
Number of Uncensored Obs. 131 113 59
Time-varying Observations 3097 197 951
(Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: † : 10% ⇤ : 5% ⇤⇤ : 1%, two-tailed tests).
(a) The correlation parameter under the second column (0.45) measures the correlation between residual du-
rations from the 1st and 2nd stages, whereas that under the third column ( 0.15) measures the correlation
between 2nd and 3rd stages.
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Table 2.5 : List of Pacific Settlement IOs
Name of Treaty Organizations Year
Global / Cross-regional Treaties
1899 Hague Treaty (Permanent Court of Arbitration) 1900–
1907 Hague Treaty (Permanent Court of Arbitration) 1910–
League of Nations 1920–46
Optional clause (Permanent Court of International Justice) 1921–46
Kellogg-Briand Pact 1929–46
United Nations 1945–
Optional clause (International Court of Justice) 1945–
Commonwealth of Nations 1971–
Non-Aligned Movement 1961–
Organization of the Islamic Conference 1973–
Western Hemisphere
Treaty on Compulsory Arbitration 1903–
1907 General Treaty of Peace and Amity 1908–18
1923 General Treaty of Peace and Amity 1923–32
Gondra Treaty 1923–
General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation 1929–
General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration 1929–
Saavedra Lamas Pact 1933–
Montevideo Convention 1934–
1936 Convention on the Existing Treaties between the American States 1937–
Rio Pact 1948–
Organization of American States 1951–
Pact of Bogota 1949–
Andean Community 1989–
Europe
Locarno Pact 1925–36
Litvinov Protocol 1929–39
Western European Union 1948–
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1949–
Warsaw Pact 1955–91
Strasbourg Treaty (Council of Europe) 1958–
Helsinki Final Act (OSCE / CSCE) 1975–
Commonwealth of Independent States 1991–
Yalta GUAM Charter 2001–
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Table 2.5 : List of Pacific Settlement IOs
Name of Treaty Organizations Year
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe 1999–
South-East European Cooperation Process 2000–
Asia and Oceania
ASEAN 1976–
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (ASEAN) 1976–
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 1985–
Conference on Interaction and CBMs in Asia 1999–
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2001–
Africa
OAU/African Union 1963–
African and Malagasy Union for Defense 1961–64
Protocol on Non-Aggression (Economic Community of West African States) 1978–
Revised charter (Economic Community of West African States) 1993–
Southern African Development Community 1993–
Defense-Security Protocol (Southern African Development Community) 2001–
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 1994–
COPAX Protocol (Economic Community of Central African States) 2000–
Community of Sahel-Saharan States 2000–
Middle East
Arab League 1945–
Baghdad Pact (Central Treaty Organization) 1955–79
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2.7 Appendix 1: Interdependent Duration Model
I begin by characterizing the univariate marginal distribution of the random vari-
ables, Tci and Tpi. Using the Weibull specification, the univariate density function
f(t), the survivor function S(t), and the distribution function F (t) are given as:
f(t) ⌘ Pr(T = t) =    ( t)(  1) exp (  t)
S(t) ⌘ Pr(T > t) = exp (  ( t) )
F (t) ⌘ Pr(T < t) = 1  S(t)
where   and   are as defined in the text. Then, I characterize three parts of the
likelihood function in turn.
L =
nY
i=1
Pr(Tci > t
0
ci)
(1 Ai) Pr(Tci = tci \ Tpi > t0pi)Ai(1 Bi) Pr(Tci = tci \ Tpi = tpi)AiBi . (3)
Specification of the first component of the likelihood function (2.3) is trivial, since
this is just a univariate survivor function evaluated at t0ci. The next step is to
calculate the second and the third component of the likelihood function, both of
which are bivariate joint distributions of Tci and Tpi. This is done by utilizing a
copula function. A copula is a function that parameterizes the dependence between
univariate marginal distributions to form a joint distribution function (Trivedi &
Zimmer 2005). Consider two random variables x and y with associated univariate
distribution functions Fx(x) and Fy(y). Sklar’s (1959) theorem establishes that there
exists a copula C( ·, · ; ✓) such that a bivariate joint distribution is defined for all
2.7. APPENDIX 1: INTERDEPENDENT DURATION MODEL 45
x and y in the extended real line as
Fxy(x, y) = C(Fx(x), Fy(y); ✓) (2.4)
where the association between the two marginal distributions is represented by the
association parameter, ✓. This result is remarkable because it shows we can construct
a new bivariate distribution based on univariate marginal distributions of known
form. As long as the univariate marginal distributions are known, an appropriate
choice of copula function C in (4.4) enables one to represent the unknown bivariate
distribution.
Now, the second component of the likelihood function, the probability that dis-
putants reach an agreement at time tci in conflict and have not yet resumed fighting
at least until t0pi is obtained by using the Bayes’ rule and copula function
Pr(Tci = tci \ Tpi > t0pi) = Pr(Tpi > t0pi|Tci = tci)⇥ Pr(Tci = tci)
= Pr(Tpi > t
0
pi|Tci = tci)⇥ fc(tci)
=
@C
 
Fp(t0pi), Fc(tci); ✓
 
@Fc(tci)
⇥ fc(tci).
Similarly, the third component of (2.3), the probability that disputants reach an
agreement at time tci in conflict and then resumed fighting at tpi is obtained as
Pr(Tci = tci \ Tpi = tpi) = fcp(tci, tpi)
=
@2C {Fc(tci), Fp(tpi); ✓}
@Fc(tci)@Fp(tpi)
.
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To complete the derivation, the last step is to choose a particular copula function
for C(, ; ✓). There are a number of di↵erent copula functions that can be used to
construct a multivariate distribution from univariate marginals (Trivedi & Zimmer
2005), but some copulas are more flexible than others in that they can accommodate
greater range of dependency between the marginals. In this application, I use the
Gaussian copula, one of the most flexible copula functions that can accommodate
both positive and negative dependency. It has the following form
C(u, v; ✓) =
Z   1(u)
 1
Z   1(v)
 1
1
2⇡(1  ✓2)1/2 exp
 (s2   2✓st+ t2)
2(1  ✓2)
 
dsdt
where   1() is the Gaussian quantile function,  1 < ✓ < 1 is the association pa-
rameter, and u = Fx(x) and v = Fy(y) for random variables x and y. The Gaussian
copula has a number of desirable characteristics. First, it allows for independence as
a special case (✓ = 0). We can thus test the existence of interdependence between the
two processes by testing whether ✓ is di↵erent from 0. Second, the Gaussian copula
is comprehensive in that as ✓ approaches the lower (upper) bound of its permissible
range, the copula approaches the theoretical lower (upper) bound. 23 This is not
true with other copulas that have been utilized to address selection bias in political
science. For example, the estimator proposed by Sartori (2003) forces one to assume
either one of the theoretical bounds as representing the true data generating process.
The consequence of this is not only that we are unable to test the existence of inter-
dependence but also that, depending on the assumption made about the direction
23 The upper and lower theoretical bounds of a joint distribution, called Fre´chet bounds, F  and
F+, are defined as F (u, v) = max[0, u+ v   1] and F+(u, v) = min[u, v].
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of the dependency, we make completely opposite inferences about the e↵ects of ex-
planatory variables on outcomes. The copula function utilized in Boehmke, Morey
& Shannon (2006) can accommodate both positive and negative dependency and
allows for testing the direction of dependency, but the permissible range is limited
to ✓ 2 ( 0.25, 0.25).
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2.8 Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics
Figure 2.3 shows the histogram of IO membership variable for the 435 crisis-dyads.
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Figure 2.3 : Distribution of IO membership variable
(Notes. This figure shows the distribution of IO membership for the 435 crisis-dyads. The horizontal
axis shows the number of Pacific Settlement IOs that both sides of the crisis-dyad both belong to,
and the vertical axis shows the frequency.).
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Table 2.6 below shows the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables for
the main analysis shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
Table 2.6 : Descriptive statistics: main model
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
IO Membership 3.082 2.302 0 11 7954
Capability Balance 0.794 0.156 0.5 1 7954
Contiguity 0.532 0.499 0 1 7954
Major Power 0.441 0.497 0 1 7954
Joint Democracy 0.096 0.295 0 1 7954
Year of Initiation 42.592 21.594 0 86 7954
Table 2.7 below shows the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables for
the interdependent duration analysis with selection shown in Table 2.4.
Table 2.7 : Descriptive statistics: three-stage model
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
IO Membership 2.642 2.41 0 11 3097
Capability Balance 0.851 0.145 0.5 1 3097
Contiguity 0.677 0.468 0 1 3097
Major Power 0.446 0.497 0 1 3097
Joint Democracy 0.21 0.407 0 1 3097
Year of Initiation 23.072 22.11 1 77 3097
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Chapter 3
Estimating Interdependent Durations in
Militarized Conflict and Beyond
Chapter Abstract
This paper introduces a simple method to analyze interdependent duration processes
that typically arise in studies of intra- and interstate conflict duration. The method
is suitable for situations where an analyst is interested in not only when but also how
a violent conflict terminates. Duration models commonly used in such situations,
such as independent competing risks models or multinomial logit models, su↵er from
bias as they ignore the interdependence between the risks of an event occurring for
di↵erent reasons. The proposed method addresses this problem by constructing a
statistical model based on a strategic model of conflict termination. Monte Carlo
simulation shows that the proposed approach outperforms conventional duration
models. I provide an empirical application of the method by studying the e↵ect of
outside intervention on duration and outcome of civil wars.
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3.1 Introduction
Why do some militarized conflicts last longer than others? What determines when
disputants terminate violence? Scholars of civil and international wars have inves-
tigated these questions for a number of reasons. Understanding the determinants
of conflict duration will help us prescribe an e↵ective policy measure to shorten the
duration of violent conflict. This is important because the longer a conflict lasts,
the more people will be killed and the more resources will be destroyed. In addition,
studies of conflict duration can also inform general theories of violent conflict by pro-
viding ways to test competing theories of conflict onset. For example, recent studies
by Ramsay (2008) and Slantchev (2004) test novel implications of the bargaining
models of war using data on war duration.
An equally important question is how, not just when, a conflict terminates. Mili-
tary conflict can end in various ways, and the mode of termination can have an impor-
tant impact on the likelihood of conflict recurrence (Hensel 1994, Hensel 1999, Lo,
Hashimoto & Reiter 2008, Quackenbush & Venteicher 2008). Existing studies on
intra- and interstate war outcomes distinguish three major forms of conflict termi-
nation: victory of one side, that of the other side, and a draw (e.g. Balch-Lindsay,
Enterline & Joyce 2008, Stam 1999). As a method of estimating these competing
risks of conflict termination, most studies use the multinomial logit model and ex-
plore how some explanatory factors (e.g., third-party intervention on behalf of one
side) may raise the probability that a conflict ends for one reason (such as victory of
the assisted side) but not for the others (such as draw or defeat of the assisted side).
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This competing-risks approach is particularly useful because it provides answers to
the questions of how and when a conflict ends at the same time.
However, a potential drawback of the commonly used competing-risks models is
that they assume that competing risks are independent, although this assumption
is often unreasonable. For example, disputants that incur significant cost of conflict
might choose to give in to the other side before a negotiated settlement is reached.
Then, the observed rate of negotiated settlement is a deceptively low indicator of
the e↵ect of some policy measures intended to induce settlement by pressuring the
disputants (such as third-party intervention) on the success of negotiated settlement.
In such situations, the multinomial logit model su↵ers from bias and underestimates
the e↵ectiveness of policy measures taken to facilitate a settlement of conflict.
Two related methods have been proposed to address the problem of dependent
competing risks, but each method su↵ers from limitations. The frailty model, or
stochastically dependent competing-risks model, captures the dependence among
competing risks by allowing the error terms governing multiple duration processes
to be correlated. A drawback of this method is that it is prohibitively di cult to
handle more than two risks because of computational burden (Gordon 2002). On the
other hand, Fukumoto’s (2009) systematically dependent competing-risks model can
readily accommodate more than two risks. However, this method requires relatively
strong assumptions about the structure of risk dependence.
This paper proposes a strategic competing-risks (hereafter, SCR) model, which is
robust against bias induced by the dependence among competing risks. The model
is derived from a strategic theory of conflict duration, and is suitable for analyzing
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the duration of intra- and interstate conflict. In short, the model assumes that two
disputants play a war of attrition game where whichever player who holds out longer
in the costly conflict wins the contest. It allows a set of independent variables to in-
fluence each of the two disputants’ willingness to incur the cost of conflict separately.
The model thus allows us to estimate the e↵ect of such explanatory variables as
third-party intervention, relative military power, the existence of natural resources,
etc., on the duration and outcome of conflict at the same time. Moreover, it is easy
to implement this method using a standard statistical software, such as STATA or
R.
Although the main goal of this paper is methodological, it also contributes to
conflict studies by correcting bias in existing analyses of third-party intervention in
conflict. The substantive message of this paper is that balanced third-party inter-
vention is more e↵ective in facilitating conflict termination than is conventionally
thought. Even when the rate of successful negotiated settlement is low, the dis-
putants may be terminating hostilities so as to avoid the cost of continued fighting
in the face of strong opposition by the international community. By discouraging
the disputants to continue fighting, third-party intervention shortens not only the
duration until a negotiated settlement but also the duration until other modes of
termination.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The first section introduces an
SCR model of survival analysis, using the running example of civil war between the
government and the rebel group. The next section conducts Monte Carlo simulation
to show how much the SCR model reduces bias which the conventional independent
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competing-risks model is prone to. The third section reanalyzes the Balch-Lindsay,
Enterline & Joyce (2008) data on civil war duration and outcome and illustrates that
the SCR model reveals important e↵ects of third-party intervention that the original
analysis underestimates. The last section concludes by summarizing methodological
and empirical findings of the paper.
3.2 Model
This paper adopts the tools and terminologies of survival analysis (also called du-
ration analysis or event history analysis) for studying when and how a civil conflict
ends. This section introduces some of the basic concepts of survival analysis and
then discusses the proposed SCR model of survival analysis. It employs a discrete
time approach to survival analysis, although it can easily be extended to a general
model using continuous time.
Each observation unit is a pair of disputants fighting a civil war, or government–
rebel dyad, at time period t. 1 The dependent random variable Y represents the
status of the disputants at the end of the time period. If the conflict ends in govern-
ment’s victory by the end of the period, Y = 1. If the conflict ends in rebel’s victory,
Y = 2. If the conflict ends in a negotiated settlement between the government and
the rebel, Y = 3. Finally, if the disputants are still at war until the end of the period,
the period is said to be “right-censored” and Y = 4.
1 The length of the time period depends on the precision of the measurement of the dependent
and independent variables. For example, if the dependent variable is measured in days, t may
be one day.
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In the discrete time model, an observation of a pair of disputants (i.e., government–
rebel dyad) appears in the dataset only if the disputants survive the previous periods
s(< t). Thus, the hazard at period t is the same as the probability that an event
occurs during period t. The quantity of interest is the marginal hazard for risk r:
hr(t) = Pr(Y = r|t), r 2 {1, 2, 3, 4}. If one assumes that these three hazards are in-
dependent of each other conditioned on covariates, one can use a single multinomial
logit model. That is, the log odds of the marginal hazard for risk r are parameterized
by the log odds of a baseline hazard for risk r (log  0r(t)) plus a linear predictor (gr(·))
of time-varying covariates (x(t), not including the constant term). Then, the model
is expressed as
Pr(Y = r|t) =  
0
r(t) exp(gr(x(t)))
1 +
P
r  
0
r(t) exp(gr(x(t)))
, (3.1)
where r 2 {1, 2, 3, 4}. In their study of civil war duration and outcome, Balch-
Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce (2008)2, Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan (2009)3,
De Rouen & Sobek (2004)4, and Humphreys (2005)5 use this model. 6 One of the
core assumptions of this model is independence of irrelevant alternatives, that com-
2 In Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce’s (2008) study, competing risks are r 2 {Government
Victory, Rebel Victory, Negotiated Settlement}. They use the continuous time model with
Cox semi-parametric specification.
3 In Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan’s (2009) study, competing risks are r 2 {Government
Victory, Rebel Victory, Formal Agreement, Low Activity}.
4 In De Rouen & Sobek’s (2004) study, competing risks are r 2 {Government Victory, Rebel
Victory, Truce/Treaty}.
5 In Humphreys’s (2005) study, competing risks are r 2 {Government Victory, Negotiation}.
6 Bennett & Stam (1998) use this model to analyze duration and outcome of interstate war. In
their study, competing risks are r 2 {Initiator Victory, Draw}.
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peting risks are independent of each other. However, one competing risk may be
dependent on another risk. For example, in situations where both sides expect that
they can defeat the other side militarily, both sides would rather continue fighting
than negotiate a settlement. Thus, the hazard of war continuation (h4) should be
dependent on the hazard of negotiated settlement (h3). Then, if one uses the multi-
nomial logit model, the coe cients of negotiated settlement hazard covariates will
be biased toward zero.
Dependence between Competing Risks
A common method to deal with dependent competing risks is the frailty model (Gordon
2002). To address bias induced by correlated hazards, it introduces correlated er-
ror terms into equation (3.1). The model of negotiated settlement and civil war
continuation hazard can be written as:
g3(x) = x3 3 + ✏3
g4(x) = x4 4 + ✏4
where xr is a vector of covariates for risk r,  r is a vector of coe cients, and the ✏r
is the error term (frailty) that is independent of covariates but dependent of each
other. More specifically, ✏3 and ✏4 are distributed bivariate normal with a correlation
⇢. Conditional upon the covariates and the error terms, the hazards (h3 and h4)
are independent. To estimate the model, one needs to integrate out these error
terms via numerical integration. When there are more than two risks (as in the
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running example of conflict outcomes, where there are four risks), however, numerical
integration of multivariate normal distribution becomes extremely di cult.
Fukumoto (2009) proposes an alternative method to address dependence among
competing risks. His method, called systematically dependent competing-risks model,
modifies the deterministic (i.e., systematic) component, namely, the linear predictor
gr(·) in equation (3.1), so that the hazard for one risk is conditioned on the same
linear combination of covariates explaining the other hazard(s). For example, if one
suspects that the hazard s depends on the hazard r, one specifies
gr(x) = xr r
gs(x) = xs s + ↵rs(gr(x))
= xs s + ↵rs(xr r),
where the parameter ↵rs captures the influence of the hazard r on the hazard s. The
analyst can similarly allow one hazard to be dependent on more than two other haz-
ards, or more than two hazards to be dependent on one hazard, although reciprocal
dependence of two hazards is not allowed (Fukumoto 2009, 744). Unlike the frailty
model, estimation of this model does not involve numerical integration of multiple
error terms, so one can easily estimate more than two risks simultaneously.
There are two practical challenges in implementing this approach, however. First,
the analyst must be able to specify the structure of hazard dependence prior to the
estimation of a model, which can be extremely cumbersome when there are more
than two hazards. Second, model identification requires that some covariates must
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be excluded from the hazard that is dependent on other hazards (Fukumoto 2009,
744). In the specification example given above, more than two variables that appear
in xr cannot appear in xs to identify the model. These two limitations make this
approach a less desirable candidate for studying conflict duration and outcome.
Strategic Competing-Risks Model
To address these problems, this paper proposes a strategic competing-risks model
that is based on a strategic model of conflict duration. The statistical model is closely
related to a formal model known as the War of Attrition model. The War of Attrition
model is commonly used in conflict research to study the duration of conflict (Krustev
2006, Langlois & Langlois 2009). In the model, two players (government and the rebel
group) are fighting over division of some good. Fighting is costly for both players,
but the player who quits fighting first must concede the disputed good to the other
player. When both players quit at the same time, the disputed good is divided
equally by the players. In each time period t, the government and the rebel group
simultaneously determine whether or not they quit fighting by the end of the period.
Then, combinations of the players’ decisions correspond to the four outcomes of civil
war discussed above. If the rebel quits and the government does not, the war ends in
government’s victory, Y = 1. If the government quits and the rebel does not, the war
ends in rebel’s victory, Y = 2. If both disputants quit, the war ends in negotiated
settlement, Y = 3. Finally, if neither side quits, the war does not end in this time
period, Y = 4.
Denote player i’s decision to quit at time t as ui(t) = 0 and his decision not to
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quit as ui(t) = 1 for i 2 {G(overment), R(ebel)}. The disputants’ decision indicator
function ui(t) takes the value of 1 when the latent utility for i at time t (u⇤i (t)) is
greater than 0 and takes the value of 0 otherwise. That is,
ui(t) =
8><>: 1 u
⇤
i (t) > 0
0 u⇤i (t)  0.
(3.2)
In order to capture the e↵ect of covariates on conflict duration and outcome, I let
the latent utility u⇤i (t) be a function of time-varying covariates (xi(t)), time (t), and
an error term (⌫i) that is independent of the covariates and time but dependent on
the error term for the other disputant’s latent utility. I follow Carter & Signorino’s
(2010) measure of time dependence, namely, cubic Talor series approximation of the
trending hazard. More specifically, the latent utility function is given as
u⇤i (t) = xi(t) i +  i(t) + ⌫i
 i(t) = ⇣1it+ ⇣2it
2 + ⇣3it
3. (3.3)
This specification allows one to test the impact of covariates on duration and out-
come of conflict by estimating how they influence the disputants’ willingness to hold
out in costly conflict. The analyst can include the same set of covariates in both
latent utility functions. 7 This does not mean, however, that one must assume that
a covariate influences the two disputants’ utilities in the same way. In fact, one can
7 That is, it is possible (but not necessary) that xG(t) and xR(t) are the same. In what follows,
whenever I drop the subscript for xi(t), it means that the same set of covariates appear in
xG(t) and xR(t).
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expect that some covariates (such as third-party intervention supporting the govern-
ment) may increase the government’s willingness to fight while decreasing the rebel’s
incentive to fight, and that some other covariates (such as the existence of natural re-
sources) may increase or decrease both disputants’ incentive to hold out. I thus allow
the coe cient vector ( i) to be di↵erent for each disputant. Moreover, as the dis-
putants can learn the other side’s ability and willingness to fight through the course
of conflict, the disputants’ latent utilities are allowed to change over time. Finally,
the model captures the influence of some unobservable factors (such as longstanding
feud between the disputants) on the disputants’ decisions through correlated error
terms. With the specification of the utility function in hand, the marginal hazards
for four competing risks at time t can be specified as
Government Victory : Pr(Y = 1|t) = Pr(uG(t) = 1 \ uR(t) = 0)
Rebel Victory : Pr(Y = 2|t) = Pr(uG(t) = 0 \ uR(t) = 1)
Negotiated Settlement : Pr(Y = 3|t) = Pr(uG(t) = 0 \ uR(t) = 0)
War Continuation : Pr(Y = 4|t) = Pr(uG(t) = 1 \ uR(t) = 1). (3.4)
In essence, the SCR model addresses dependence among competing risks by di-
rectly modeling the structure of strategic interaction between two disputants. 8 It
captures the e↵ect of covariates on conflict duration and outcome through a two-layer
8 In this sense, the model shares similar features of existing discrete choice models of strategic
interaction (Lewis & Schultz 2003; Signorino 1999, 2002, 2003; Smith 1999). Among others,
Smith’s (1999) Strategically Censored Discrete Choice model employs a structure similar to
that of the present paper. The notable di↵erence is that the SCR model incorporates time
component and can be generalized to continuous time model.
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structure. First, the SCR model specifies how the covariates impact each of the dis-
putants’ willingness to bear the cost of continued fighting, as shown in (3.3). It then
specifies the mechanism through which disputants’ decisions give rise to di↵erent
conflict outcomes, as shown in (3.4). The model avoids bias induced by strategic de-
pendence between competing risks, which independent competing-risks models (such
as the multinomial logit model or independent competing-risks Cox model) are prone
to. Consider the aforementioned example situation where, because of some unob-
served factors, both of the disputants expect that they can defeat the other side
militarily. In such situations, the disputants would rather continue fighting than
negotiating settlement. The SCR model captures the inflated hazard of war continu-
ation and the deflated hazard of negotiated settlement via the (positively) correlated
error terms that appear in the latent utility of war continuation. On the other hand,
the multinomial logit model su↵ers from bias because the hazard of war continuation
is underestimated whereas the hazard of negotiated settlement is overestimated.
The SCR model has a number of advantages over the conventional approaches
to dependent competing risks. Although the specific version of the SCR model in-
troduced here has as many as four competing risks (three conflict outcomes plus
one “censored” outcome), the model is based on just two utility functions (one for
government and the other for the rebel group) and has only two error terms. There-
fore, estimation of the model is significantly easier than the frailty model with four
competing risks. Moreover, the SCR model can easily be extended to include any
number of distinct conflict outcomes without increasing the number of utility func-
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tions. 9 Finally, it is possible (but not necessary) that the two utility functions have
the same set of covariates. Therefore, the analyst does not have to identify a covari-
ate that influences one player’s utility function but not the other, which is extremely
di cult to find in practice.
Estimation
To estimate the model, I assume that ⌫G and ⌫R are distributed standard bivariate
normal with correlation ⇢. Then, the first line in (3.4) can be expressed as
Pr(Y = 1|t) = Pr(u⇤G(t) > 0 \ u⇤R(t) < 0)
= Pr(x(t) G +  G(t) + ⌫G > 0 \ x(t) R +  R(t) + ⌫R < 0)
= Pr(x(t) G +  G(t) + ⌫G > 0 \ x(t) R +  R(t) + ⌫R < 0)
=  2(x(t) G +  G(t), x(t) R    R(t), ⇢), (3.5)
where  2(, , ⇢) is the standard bivariate normal distribution with correlation ⇢. Sim-
ilarly, the other three hazards in (3.4) can be specified as
Pr(Y = 2|t) =  2( x(t) G    G(t), x(t) R +  R(t), ⇢)
Pr(Y = 3|t) =  2( x(t) G    G(t), x(t) R    R(t), ⇢)
Pr(Y = 4|t) =  2(x(t) G +  G(t), x(t) R +  R(t), ⇢). (3.6)
9 To increase the number of outcomes, one can introduce threshold parameter(s) into the latent
utility functions, thereby increasing the number of values that the decision functions can take.
3.3. MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 63
Suppose there are n paris of disputants and a pair of disputants j is observed up to
the Tjth period. Then the likelihood function is obtained as
L(✓) =
nY
j=1
TjY
t=1
4Y
r=1
Pr(Y = r|t)
where ✓ is a set of parameters (the  ’s, the ⇣’s, and the ⇢) and Pr(Y = r|t) is
given in (3.5) and (3.6). The likelihood function can be evaluated using a bivariate
probit model that is available in standard commercial statistical software packages.
To estimate the SCR model via the bivariate probit, one uses the binary decision
indicators uG(t) and uR(t) as the dependent variables.
3.3 Monte Carlo Simulation
This section performs Monte Carlo simulation to demonstrate that, when the true
data generation process is what the SCR model assumes, conventional independent
competing-risks models (such as the multinomial logit model and Cox independent
competing-risks model) produce biased estimates. The results show that these mod-
els underestimates the frequency of negotiated settlement, thereby underestimating
the e↵ect of some covariates associated with negotiated settlement. The Monte Carlo
simulation is designed so that it is easy to compare with the estimated parameters
one obtains by applying the SCR model to the civil war data, which we will see in
the next section. The number of observations is 200. The independent variables are
three binary variables measuring the types of third-party intervention: intervention
supporting the government (zG), intervention supporting the rebel group (zR), and
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balanced intervention (zB). The values of these variables are deterministic and fixed
through the whole process of this simulation. Specifically, zG takes the value of one
only in the first 50 (25%) observations, zR takes the value of one only in the second 50
(25%) observations, and zB takes the value of one in the third 50 (25%) observations.
A single iteration of the simulation begins by randomly drawing the values of two
error terms governing the latent utility of the disputants, eG, eR, from a standard
bivariate normal distribution with correlation 0.8. Positive correlation between the
error terms means that there are some unobservable factors (such as both sides’ mu-
tual optimism about the prospect of military victory) that influence the disputants’
willingness to continue fighting in the same direction. In other words, positively cor-
related error terms increase the probability that both sides make the same decisions
at a given time (i.e., quit at the same time, or continue fighting at the same time).
These error terms are unobservable to the analyst, and a failure to correct for these
correlated error terms will underestimate the frequency of negotiated settlement and
war continuation.
With the three independent variables and the error terms, we obtain the latent
utility as follows:
u⇤G(t) = zG   zR + zB + eG
u⇤R(t) =  zG + zR + 0.5 ⇤ zB + eR.
That is, third party intervention supporting one side increases the supported dis-
putant’s willingness to fight while decreasing that of the other side. Balanced in-
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Figure 3.1 : Biased estimates of the multinomial logit model
(Notes. This figure illustrates the results of Monte Carlo simulation. The densities show the
predicted probabilities of Negotiated Settlement when there is balanced intervention in civil war.
The left density (red) is obtained from the multinomial logit model, whereas the right density
(green) is obtained from the SCR model. The vertical line is drawn at the mean of the true rate of
Negotiated Settlement when there is balanced intervention. We can see that the multinomial logit
model underestimates the frequency of Negotiated Settlement.)
tervention increases both sides’ utilities, but the e↵ect is greater for the government
than for the rebel. Using these utility functions, I obtain civil war outcomes accord-
ing to the rules (3.2) and (3.4). I then apply an independent competing-risks model
(i.e., the multinomial logit model) and the SCR model to the resulting data set, and
store the estimates. These processes are repeated 500 times.
Results
Figure 3.1 illustrates the results of the Monte Carlo simulation. It shows the pre-
dicted probabilities of Negotiated Settlement estimated from the multinomial logit
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model (left density in red) and the SCR model (right density in green) when balanced
intervention (zB) takes the value of one. The vertical line drawn at 0.72 shows the
mean value of the true frequency of Negotiated Settlement from the 500 iterations
of simulation. From this figure, we can see that the multinomial logit model signifi-
cantly underestimates the frequency of Negotiated Settlement whereas the estimates
from the SCR model are very close to the true value. This means that the multino-
mial logit model underestimates the e↵ect of balanced intervention on the likelihood
of Negotiated Settlement. The source of this bias is its inability to account for depen-
dence among competing risks that stem from the correlation between the disputants’
latent utilities.
3.4 Empirical Application
This section continues to demonstrate the usefulness of the SCR model by applying
this model to the civil war data by Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce (2008). The
data set contains information on duration and outcome of 213 civil wars from 1816
to 1997 taken from the Correlates of War (COW) project. 194 of the 213 civil wars
were terminated by the end of 1997. For those terminated civil wars, the dates of
initiation and termination and three types of outcomes were recorded: Government
Victory (109 wars), Rebel Victory (45 wars), and Negotiated Settlement (40 wars).
The remaining 19 (= 213  194) civil wars that were ongoing at the end of 1997 are
treated as right-censored. In the terminology of the present paper, each civil war is
simultaneously being exposed to four competing risks at any moment, and one of the
four risks is realized at the end of the observation period (day). Total time at risk is
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246, 538. 10
Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce’s (2008) theoretical focus is to understand the
e↵ect of third-party intervention on civil war duration and outcome. Does a third-
party intervention shorten or lengthen the duration of civil war? Does a biased
intervention in support of one side of a conflict shorten the time until the supported
side wins? To investigate these questions, the authors collect information on the
nature of all observed third-party interventions in civil war as well as the initiation
and termination dates each intervention. Using the COW Intra-State War Partici-
pants Data, the authors identify three types of interventions: third-party intervention
supporting the government, intervention supporting the rebel group, and balanced
intervention supporting both the government and the rebel group. More specifically,
Intervention for Government is coded 1 when there is at least one third-party in-
tervention supporting the government and 0 otherwise. 11 Intervention for Rebel
is coded 1 when there is at least one third-party intervention supporting the rebel
group and 0 otherwise. 12 Balanced Intervention is coded 1 when there is at least
one third-party intervention supporting both the government and the rebel group
and 0 otherwise. 13 These three binary variables are time-varying covariates. Balch-
Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce (2008) hypothesize that a third-party intervention in
10 That is, there are 246, 538 days in the data set. Note that, in Balch-Lindsay, Enterline &
Joyce’s (2008) original analysis, the total time at risk is 249, 462, which is about 1% larger.
This discrepancy is due to some errors in the original article with respect to the recording of
the initiation and termination dates of a few civil wars. Correction of these errors does not
cause any significant changes to the findings of the original article.
11 Of the 213 civil wars, 29 (14%) had intervention supporting the government.
12 Of the 213 civil wars, 18 (9%) had intervention supporting the rebel group.
13 Of the 213 civil wars, 6 (3%) had intervention supporting both the government and opposition.
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support of one side reduces time to a military victory of the supported side while
increasing time to the other civil war outcomes. They also expect that a balanced
intervention reduces time to negotiated settlement while increasing time to the other
civil war outcomes.
In addition to these main independent variables, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce
(2008) have the following five control time-invariant covariates: Separatist is a
binary variable measuring whether or not the goal of the rebel group in a civil war
is separatist. War Costs is a per capita indicator of civil war costs, measured by the
total number of battle deaths sustained by all state participants at the end of the
civil war divided by the prewar total population of the civil war state. Government
Reputation is measured as the prior frequency of negotiated settlements agreed to by
a civil war state divided by the prior total frequency of civil war outcomes (negotiated,
victory, defeat). It ranges from 0 to 1. Economic Development is calculated as the
natural log of the sum of energy consumption and iron/steel production. It is lagged
by one year prior to the civil war. Finally, Democracy measures whether or not the
civil war state’s Polity score in the year prior to the civil war was greater than 5.
To analyze these data, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce (2008) utilize an inde-
pendent Cox competing-risks model. The Cox competing-risks model is the continuous-
time equivalent of the discrete-time multinomial logit model. 14 While both Cox and
the multinomial logit models allow a covariate to have a di↵erent e↵ect on time
to di↵erent civil war outcomes, they assume that competing risks are independent,
conditioned on covariates. However, as discussed above, this assumption is not rea-
14 On the relationship between continuous-time duration models and discrete-time logit duration
model, see Beck, Katz & Tucker (1998).
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sonable due to the strategic interaction between the disputants. I demonstrate below
that the SCR model reveals di↵erent dynamics than does the Cox competing-risks
model.
Results
I begin by re-estimating the original Cox models using the slightly modified version
of the original data set. 15 Then, I estimate the SCR model using the same modified
data set. This way, I can ensure that any di↵erence in the results from the Cox and
the SCR models are not driven by the di↵erences in the data sets used. For the
purpose of model comparison, I use the same set of independent variables used in
Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce (2008). 16
To implement an independent Cox competing-risks analysis, one estimates mul-
tiple Cox models separately for each civil war outcome. Specifically, using the right-
censored cases as the baseline, one estimates three Cox duration models for three
di↵erent outcomes. Estimation results are reported in Table 3.1. This table almost
exactly replicates the results reported in Table I of Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce
(2008).
[Table 3.1 About Here]
Based on these results, I calculate the survival functions for three competing risks.
A survival function for outcome Y represents how many observations have survived
15 As mentioned above, I corrected some minor coding errors found in the original data set.
Nevertheless, I was able to replicate almost the same results reported in the original article.
16 The authors interact Intervention for Government, Separatist, War Costs, and Economic
Development with a natural log of time to capture the time-varying e↵ects of these variables.
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the risk of a civil war ending in Y up to a particular point time. For example, if
the survival function for Government Victory at the 100th day is 0.8, it means that
80% of the civil wars have survived the risk of Government Victory up to the 100th
day, or equivalently, 20 % of the civil wars have ended in Government Victory by the
100th day. Thus, if a survival function for outcome Y has a steeper slope, the time
to a civil war ending in outcome Y is shorter.
Figure 3.2 reports the estimated survival functions from the Cox models. 17 In
this figure, three types of third-party interventions are contrasted: Intervention for
Government (top left panel), Intervention for Rebel (top right panel), and Balanced
Intervention (bottom right panel). In each panel, solid curves in red shows the sur-
vival probability for Government Victory, dotted curves in green show that for Rebel
Victory, and dashed curve in blue show that for Negotiated Settlement. We can
see from the top two panels that third-party intervention supporting the govern-
ment shortens the duration until government victory relative to the duration until
rebel victory, and that intervention supporting the rebel shortens the duration until
rebel victory relative to the duration until government victory. These results sup-
port Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce’s (2008) hypotheses. However, as the bottom
right panel shows, balanced intervention does not appear to facilitate negotiated set-
tlement. If anything, the results show that balanced intervention leads to shorter
time to government victory while making negotiated settlement almost impossible
(survival function for negotiated settlement takes the values very close to 1 up to
17 Three panels in Figure 3.2 correspond to Figures 1 to 3 in Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce
(2008, 358–359). We can see that my graphs based on the modified data set are almost
indistinguishable from the original graphs.
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15th year). Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce (2008) thus do not find support for
their hypothesis about balanced intervention.
I now apply the SCR model to the same data. I first transform Balch-Lindsay,
Enterline & Joyce’s (2008) data set from a continuous-time duration format into a
discrete-time duration format. This is done by creating multiple rows of observations
per each civil war corresponding to the number of time at risk (i.e., 246, 538 days).
For example, a civil war that lasted for 100 days will have 100 rows in the transformed
data set. Then, for the transformed data set, I code two binary decision indicator
functions uG(t) and uR(t), which are used as the dependent variables in the bivariate
probit estimation. If the aforementioned civil war ended in Government Victory after
100 days, uG(t) takes the value of one for all the 100 rows (because the government
did not quit) whereas uR(t) takes the value of one for the first 99 rows and zero for
the 100th row (because the rebel group quit on the 100th day). 18 As there are 109
civil wars that ended in government victory, 45 civil wars that ended in rebel victory,
and 40 civil wars that ended in negotiated settlement, uG(t) takes the value of zero
in 45 + 40 = 85 rows and uR(t) takes the value of zero in 109 + 40 = 149 rows.
[Table 3.2 About Here]
Table 3.2 reports the estimation results of the SCR model. The latent utility
functions for the government and the rebel groups are explained by the vector of
time-varying covariates x(t) that has the same set of independent variables used in
the Cox models and a smoothed function of time  (t) (i.e., linear combination of time,
18 Using the terminology of Beck, Katz & Tucker (1998), one can call the transformed data set
as in a bivariate binary time-series cross-section (BBTSCS) format.
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time2, time3). The SCR model reveals how each covariate influences the disputants’
willingness to hold out in costly war of attrition. Those covariates with a positive
coe cient increase the corresponding disputant’s incentive to continue fighting, while
those with a negative coe cient give the corresponding disputant incentive to give
in to the other side. The easiest way to understand how such changes in disputants’
incentives to fight translate into conflict duration and outcome is to calculate the
survival function for each outcome. Before turning to the survival functions, however,
I briefly discuss the estimated e↵ects for the main independent variables measuring
three types of third-party interventions.
First, third-party intervention supporting government has its linear term and an
interaction term with ln(time). Although the individual coe cients are not indepen-
dently significant, they are jointly statistically significant at a 5 % significance level.
For both the government and the rebel equations, the linear terms are estimated neg-
ative and the time interactions are estimated positive. This means that third-party
intervention for the government that occurs in earlier phases of a civil war decreases
the disputants’ willingness to fight, whereas it increases the disputants’ willingness
to fight if the intervention occurs in later phases of a civil war. We can find out when
such a switching happens by calculating the point at which the combined coe cient
changes from negative to positive. For example, the linear term for the government
utility is  0.15 and the time interaction is 0.03. Then, the combined coe cient is
 0.15 + 0.03⇥ln(time), which becomes positive on the 149th day. 19 Second, the
Intervention for Rebel variable significantly decreases the government’s willingness
19 This can be obtained by solving the equality:  0.15+0.03⇥ln(time) > 0, which gives us: time
> 148.4132.
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to fight, which makes an intuitive sense. Third, the Balanced Intervention variable
significantly increases the government’s willingness to fight while exerting little influ-
ence on the rebel group’s incentive. How are these changes in disputants’ incentive
translated into civil war duration and outcomes?
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Figure 3.3 reports the estimated survival functions from the SCR model. As in
the previous figure, three types of third-party interventions are contrasted: Interven-
tion for Government (top left panel), Intervention for Rebel (top right panel), and
Balanced Intervention (bottom right panel). Again, the top two panels demonstrate
that third-party intervention supporting the government shortens the duration until
government victory relative to the duration until rebel victory, and that intervention
supporting the rebel shortens the duration until rebel victory relative to the duration
until government victory. These results are consistent with Balch-Lindsay, Enterline
& Joyce’s (2008) hypotheses and their findings. The most notable di↵erence between
the results of the SCR model and the Cox model can be seen in the bottom right
panel where I plot the e↵ect of balanced intervention. We can see that the survival
function for negotiated settlement generated by the SCR model has a much steeper
slope than that generated by the Cox model. That is, the SCR model reveals that
balanced intervention indeed facilitates negotiated settlement. Balch-Lindsay, En-
terline & Joyce (2008) predict this result, but they fail to find an empirical support
for their argument using the Cox model.
3.5 Conclusion
Competing-risks survival analysis has become a widely used tool for analyzing whether,
when, and how an event occurs. These competing risks are often dependent on one
another, but the commonly used competing-risks models (such as the independent
Cox competing-risks model and the multinomial logit model) assume that they are
independent. The SCR model proposed in this paper addresses the problem of de-
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pendent competing risks by specifying the underlying strategic interaction based on
a War of Attrition model. Monte Carlo simulation demonstrated that the oft-used
multinomial logit duration model su↵ers from bias. The proposed model is easy to
implement and robust against bias induced from the strategic dependence among
competing risks.
This paper also has relevance to the civil war research by applying the SCR model
to data on civil war duration and outcome. The main substantive contribution of the
paper is to demonstrate that balanced third-party intervention has a much stronger
impact on the likelihood of negotiated settlement between the disputants than pre-
viously thought. This finding has relevance for policy debates on the desirability of
third-party intervention.
Although I use the example of civil war duration and outcome throughout the
paper, the model is applicable to a number of areas of research other than civil
war, where duration and outcome of a certain event are determined by decisions of
two players. For example, research on duration and outcome of territorial claims,
international rivalry, alliance agreement, and trade negotiation can all be benefitted
by using the SCR model.
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Table 3.1 : Independent Cox Competing-Risks Analysis of Civil War Duration &
Outcome, 1816–1997
Government Rebel Negotiated
Victory Victory Settlement
Intervention for Government 2.51† 1.87 5.78†
(1.84) (1.61) (3.76)
Intervention for Government ⇥ ln(time) -0.63⇤  0.41⇤  0.76†
(0.28) (0.23) (0.49)
Intervention for Rebel  1.65† 1.74⇤⇤ 1.40⇤⇤
(1.12) (0.47) (0.56)
Balanced Intervention 1.76†  36.36⇤⇤  2.65⇤
(1.36) (1.07) (1.21)
Separatist 0.96  0.09 8.17⇤⇤
(1.04) (1.70) (2.92)
Separatist ⇥ ln(time)  0.23†  0.18  1.23⇤⇤
(0.17) (0.26) (0.41)
War Costs 111.56 171.54⇤⇤  212.48†
(205.39) (63.01) (157.83)
War Costs ⇥ ln(time)  35.31  33.60⇤⇤ 25.22
(38.20) (11.82) (20.35)
Government Reputation  1.36⇤⇤  0.67 0.14
(0.52) (0.58) (0.62)
Economic Development 0.96⇤⇤ 0.92⇤⇤ 0.50†
(0.15) (0.22) (0.35)
Economic Development ⇥ ln(time)  0.17⇤⇤  0.18⇤⇤  0.08†
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Democracy 0.33  0.35  1.19
(0.33) (0.53) (1.21)
Civil wars 213 213 213
Civil war failures 109 45 40
Time at risk 246,538 246,538 246,538
Spells 926 926 926
Log likelihood  425.77  174.08  132.48
Wald  2(12,12,12) 79.50
⇤⇤ 4239.04⇤⇤ 36.01⇤⇤
Significance (one-tailed): † p < 0.10, ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.2 : Strategic Competing-Risks Model of Civil War Duration
& Outcome, 1816–1997
Utility for Utility for
Government Rebel
Intervention for Government  0.15  0.16
(0.38) (0.43)
Intervention for Government ⇥ ln(time) 0.03 0.06
(0.05) (0.06)
Intervention for Rebel  0.48⇤⇤ 0.02
(0.10) (0.15)
Balanced Intervention 0.86⇤⇤ 0.13
(0.29) (0.24)
Separatist 0.21 0.11
(0.22) (0.17)
Separatist ⇥ ln(time) 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
War Costs 9.11 67.57†
(26.04) (44.23)
WarCosts ⇥ ln(time)  0.78  7.45
(3.39) (5.86)
Government Reputation 0.08 0.23⇤
(0.09) (0.10)
Economic Development  0.03  0.05⇤⇤
(0.03) (0.02)
Economic Development ⇥ ln(time) 0.01⇤ 0.01⇤
(0.01) (0.01)
Democracy  0.04 0.14
(0.10) (0.13)
time 0.0004⇤⇤ 0.0003⇤⇤
(0.0002) (0.0001)
time2  1.23e-07⇤  7.81e-08⇤⇤
(5.39e-08) (4.26e-08)
time3 8.52e-12† 4.97e-12
(5.70e-12) (4.80e-12)
Constant 2.98⇤⇤ 2.84⇤⇤
(0.10) (0.06)
athrho 1.38⇤⇤
(0.09)
Number of observations 246,538 246,538
Number of zeros 85 149
Log likelihood  1686.60
Significance (one-tailed): † p < 0.10, ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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3.6 Appendix: Descriptive Statistics
The following table shows the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used
in the analyses.
Table 3.3 : Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Intervention for Government 0.172 0.378 0 1 246538
Intervention for Rebel 0.096 0.295 0 1 246538
Balanced Intervention 0.07 0.255 0 1 246538
Separatist 0.369 0.483 0 1 246538
War Costs 0.005 0.01 0 0.088 246538
Government Reputation 0.128 0.286 0 1 246538
Economic Development 6.584 3.33 0 13.896 246538
Democracy 0.092 0.289 0 1 246538
time 1646.8 1463.773 0 7395 246538
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Figure 3.2 : Estimated survival functions from the independent Cox competing-risks
model
(Notes. Survival probabilities are calculated for three intervention scenarios: Intervention for Gov-
ernment, Intervention for Rebel, and Balanced Intervention. Binary covariates are held at their
median values, and continuous variables are held at their mean values. The results are based on
the independent Cox models reported in Table 3.1.)
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Figure 3.3 : Estimated survival functions from the SCR model
(Notes. Survival probabilities are calculated for three intervention scenarios: Intervention for Gov-
ernment, Intervention for Rebel, and Balanced Intervention. Binary covariates are held at their
median values, and continuous variables are held at their mean values. The results are based on
the SCR model estimates reported in Table 3.2.)
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Chapter 4
The Strength of Cease-fire Agreements and the
Duration of Postwar Peace
Chapter Abstract
Do stronger cease-fire agreements keep peace longer after war? Although there are
theoretical reasons to expect that stronger agreements promote durable peace, the
extant empirical research provides mixed support for this expectation. This paper
reexamines this argument empirically, addressing two inferential problems overlooked
in the past studies. First, since the strength of cease-fire agreements is endogenous
to the baseline prospect for peace, I employ a copula-based two-stage estimation
that explains agreement strength and peace duration jointly. Second, I allow the
e↵ect of agreement strength to vary over time. This is important because agreement
strength matters little right after the war, for there exists a rough consensus among
the ex-belligerents about the likely outcome of a next war. As time passes, however,
the e↵ect of agreement strength will start to show because there will be a greater
chance that some exogenous shocks distort this consensus. Analyzing the duration of
postwar peace from 1914 to 2001, I demonstrate that stronger cease-fire agreements
indeed stabilize peace but only after a few years have passed.
4.1. INTRODUCTION 82
4.1 Introduction
Do stronger cease-fire agreements keep peace longer after war? Are the ex-belligerents
able to maintain more durable peace when they sign an agreement that incorporates
institutional mechanisms designed to alter the strategic environment in which states
interact with each other? Scholars of international relations have argued that interna-
tional agreements can change states’ behaviors even when there is no central author-
ity that enforces an agreement. Studies have demonstrated that international agree-
ments are not merely scraps of paper, but can indeed constrain states’ behavior and
promote cooperation even in the absence of direct enforcement in wide range of issue
areas, such as militarized conflicts (Leeds 2003), territorial disputes (Mattes 2008),
human rights protection (Hathaway 2002), monetary a↵airs (Simmons 2000), and
environmental protection (Young 1999). Fortna (2003, 2004) argues that stronger
cease-fire agreements, characterized by mechanisms such as confidence building mea-
sures, dispute settlement procedures, peacekeeping forces, etc., are able to help ex-
belligerents overcome the obstacles to peace, hence prolonging the duration of peace
after war.
However, although we have good theoretical reasons to believe that stronger
cease-fire agreements promote durable peace, empirical findings on this relationship
are rather mixed. On the one hand, Fortna (2003, 2004) finds empirical support for
her argument using data on duration of peace after interstate wars for the period from
1946 to 1998. On the other hand, subsequent studies have provided little support
for this relationship. Analyzing the data from the same period, Werner & Yuen
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(2005) find a weak relationship or no e↵ect of agreement strength, depending on the
specification. Moreover, a recent study by Lo, Hashimoto & Reiter (2008) also finds
no e↵ect using an expanded data set that covers the interstate wars from 1914 to
2001.
This paper reevaluates this argument empirically and demonstrates that agree-
ment strength indeed prolongs postwar peace duration. In doing so, I address two
inferential problems that have troubled previous studies. The first challenge in uncov-
ering the true e↵ect of agreement strength is that agreement strength is endogenous
to the prospect for peace: ex-belligerents will seek to reach stronger cease-fire agree-
ments when they have more fragile prospect for peace. This means that, if we fail
to correct for this endogeneity, our estimate will be negatively biased. To address
this issue, I develop an empirical strategy that allows me to estimate the e↵ect of
agreement strength in the face of endogeneity. The second inferential challenge is
that the e↵ect of agreement strength will be likely to vary over time as the underlying
conditions change.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I explain
the theoretical reasons as to why we should expect stronger cease-fire agreements to
foster longer peace after war. Then, the following section discusses two inferential
problems that have plagued previous empirical e↵orts. I will then introduce a re-
search design that addresses both of the problems, and present the empirical results.
The last section concludes with policy implications. The results of this study should
be encouraging to policy makers concerned with conflict management. Well designed
agreements can enhance the prospect for peace even under di cult circumstances.
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4.2 Why Stronger Agreements Promote Peace
Why does war occur? This has been one of the most important questions that con-
cerns scholars of international relations for a long time. Thanks to the development
of bargaining theories, the past two decades have seen a significant development in
the scholarly e↵orts to answer this question. The bargaining model of war attributes
the causes of war to a failure of pre-war bargaining between disputants. Given that
war is costly and most wars end in an agreement, under broad conditions, there exists
a bargain (division of the disputed good) that can make both sides better o↵ than
fighting. The bargaining model of war maintains that pre-war bargaining can break
down in costly fighting when 1) disputants have uncertainties about the underlying
balance of power (and hence about the outcome of war), or 2) disputants cannot
commit to following through an agreement under anarchy (Fearon 1995).
One of the strengths of the bargaining model of war is that it can not only
explain the outbreak of war but also provide insight into duration, termination, and
recurrence of war. Logical consistency of an argument requires that the “causes” of
a war must be resolved for the war to end (Wagner 2000). If states fight because
both sides are uncertain about the other side’s military power, for example, then
fighting must contribute to a resolution of this uncertainty, and the war ends when
both sides have learned the other side’s strength and neither side has incentive to
continue fighting. This means that, at war’s end, the disputants must be both 1)
in agreement about the underlying power balance and 2) capable of committing to
following through on a cease-fire. This argument further implies that postwar peace
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may break down in another war when the underlying conditions that have led to a
termination of fighting change in the future (Werner 1999).
War is not always inevitable, however, even when such a change in underlying
conditions arises and the war-ending settlement becomes obsolete after war. One vi-
able way for ex-belligerents to maintain stable postwar peace in the face of changing
conditions is to devise strong cease-fire agreements that have institutional mech-
anisms that help them resolve bargaining problems that may arise in the future.
For example, some cease-fire agreements incorporate institutional devices such as
dispute settlement mechanisms or confidence building measures that will provide
the ex-belligerents with information about the actions and intentions of the other
side, thus reducing uncertainties that may precipitate violence. Those agreements
that are characterized by the presence of third-party involvement or peacekeeping
force will enhance ex-belligerents’ ability to commit to compliance with the cease-
fire by raising the reputational cost or audience cost of noncompliance. In addition,
Fortna (2003, 2004) argues that stronger cease-fire agreements can also contribute to
longer peace by controlling accidents. Those agreements that incorporate arms con-
trol provisions, confidence building measures, demilitarized zones, or specify treaty
obligations in more precise wordings, will be able to prevent accidents or involun-
tary defection from happening, or prevent such accidents from escalating into more
violent conflicts.
Given that it would be costly for the disputants to negotiate and implement
these mechanisms, it is highly unlikely that the disputants would bother signing
stronger agreements if they do not expect agreement strength to make a di↵erence.
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Nevertheless, previous studies have been unable to find a robust relationship between
agreement strength and the duration of postwar peace. Whereas Fortna’s (2003,
2004) initial statistical analyses that cover the period from 1946 to 1998 lend support
for this expectation, subsequent studies have found little support. Analyzing the
same time period, Werner & Yuen (2005) find that agreement strength matters little
once they control for the conditions under which bargaining obstacles are particularly
likely to arise. They conclude that institutional devices incorporated in cease-fire
agreements may not be strong enough when the war-ending settlement becomes
obsolete. Moreover, a recent study by Lo, Hashimoto & Reiter (2008) extends the
time frame of Fortna’s (2003, 2004) original dataset and finds that agreement strength
has no e↵ect on postwar peace duration.
I argue that the lack of empirical support for this relationship is because previous
studies do not o↵er a fair test of the theoretical argument. The next section discusses
two inferential problems that have plagued previous research and o↵ers a way to
overcome these problems.
4.3 Two Problems with Existing Studies
The first inferential problem is that the strength of agreements is not randomly
assigned but strategically determined by the disputants, which generates an endo-
geneity problem. As Fortna (2004) demonstrates, the disputants will seek to sign
stronger agreements when they face a fragile prospect for peace after war. Then,
if we do not control for this process of self-selection into stronger agreements, there
will be negative bias in our estimate of the e↵ect of agreement strength. Figure 4.1
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illustrates this problem graphically. The theoretical argument suggests that stronger
agreements prolong the duration of postwar peace, implying positive correlation be-
tween the two observable variables in the Figure, Strength of Agreement and Dura-
tion of Postwar Peace. However, the endogeneity of agreement strength can make it
di cult for us to find the implied positive correlation. Suppose that the disputants
tend to sign stronger cease-fire agreements when they expect that the underlying
conditions are likely to fluctuate, thus the prospect for peace is fragile. This means
that there will be a positive correlation between Strength of Agreement and Fragile
Prospect for Peace. Then, if the disputants have, on average, correct estimates about
their future prospect for peace, the correlation between Fragile Prospect for Peace
and Duration of Postwar Peace should be negative. In situations like this, if we fail
to control for Fragile Prospect for Peace in our regression analysis, the estimated
e↵ect of Strength of Agreement on Duration of Postwar Peace will be smaller than
it actually is. The challenge for inference here is that the disputants’ expectation
(Fragile Prospect for Peace) is unobservable to the researcher, and hence di cult if
not impossible to control for.
Recognizing this endogeneity, researchers have tried to alleviate the problem by
controlling for observable variables that are supposedly correlated with the unobserv-
able fragile prospect for peace. However, it is impractical to assume that a researcher
can control for all the variables that are associated with the unobservable prospect
for peace. Therefore, it is likely that, even after controlling for the observables, there
exist some unobservable factors that are negatively correlated with the duration of
peace and positively influencing the strength of agreement. If we fail to control
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Figure 4.1 : Endogeneity of agreement strength
(Notes. This figure graphically illustrates the endogeneity problem. Observable variables (Strength
of Agreement and Duration of Postwar Peace) are shown in white squares, and an unobservable
variable (Fragile Prospect for Peace) is shown in a gray ellipse.)
for such unobservables, our empirical results will still be biased against finding the
expected positive e↵ect of stronger agreements on peace duration.
The second problem is that the existing studies have assumed that the e↵ect of
cease-fire treaties is constant over time, although the e↵ect of agreement strength will
probably vary over time. In fact, we have theoretical reasons to believe that the e↵ect
of agreement strength will depend on the underlying conditions that change over
time. In the context of international agreements that promote peaceful settlement of
territorial disputes, Mattes (2008) demonstrates that the conflict reducing e↵ect of
such agreements is much greater when the underlying conditions have changed since
the time of signing of agreements.
Applying the logic of Mattes’s (2008) theoretical argument, we should expect
that the e↵ect of cease-fire agreement will grow stronger as time passes. Immediately
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after a war ends, there will exist a rough consensus among the ex-belligerents about
the distribution of power between them, and hence about the likely outcome of
a next war should one happen. From the viewpoint of the bargaining theory of
war discussed above, this convergence of expectation is the very reason why the
disputants stop fighting in the first place (Wagner 2000). This means that, right after
the war ends, there are few sources of bargaining problems, and so, the agreement
strength will probably not make much of a di↵erence. However, as time passes,
there will be a greater chance that some exogenous shocks distort this consensus,
creating bargaining problems. It may be the case that some new issues to fight
over arise between the ex-belligerents, or a more hawkish leader comes into power
in one country who sees greater benefit in challenging the previously agreed status
quo, or one country’s military power grows faster than that of the other country,
which creates dynamic commitment problems. These are the situations in which the
agreement strength will make a greater di↵erence. In other words, the agreement
strength will only be truly tested after the underlying conditions change over time.
Therefore, by treating the e↵ect of agreement strength to be constant over time, the
existing empirical tests have been biased against finding support for the theoretical
expectation.
4.4 The Empirical Strategy
To address these two inferential challenges discussed above, I develop a research
design that endogenizes agreement strength and relaxes the assumption of a time-
constant e↵ect of agreement strength. The first problem is addressed by constructing
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a full-information maximum likelihood estimator that jointly estimates agreement
strength and peace duration. The second problem is addressed by including an
interaction term between time and the strength of agreement, thus allowing the e↵ect
of agreement strength to vary over time. In what follows, I present a statistical model
that I have developed to estimate the e↵ect of agreement strength on peace duration
in the presence of the endogeneity problem.
Statistical Model
The statistical model is an extension of the procedures utilized to address endogenous
treatment, and shares similar features with other multivariate statistical models that
control for endogeneity (c.f., Angrist & Pischke 2009, Ch.4). The approach is to
estimate agreement strength and postwar peace duration jointly, while controlling for
the correlation between the two processes. I begin by characterizing the disputants’
latent propensity to reach stronger agreements at war’s end, and then the duration
of postwar peace. I then show how a separate estimation of each can lead to bias,
and derive a statistical model that corrects for it.
Let s⇤ denote the belligerents’ unobserved propensity to reach stronger agree-
ments. I assume it takes the following form:
S⇤ = z  + µ (4.1)
where µ follows a Poisson distribution, z is the vector of independent variables, and
  is the vector of coe cients. We do not observe S⇤. Instead, we observe s, which
takes integer numbers greater than or equal to zero. s has a univariate distribution
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function denoted as Fs(·) Then, let T denote the random variable that describes the
duration of postwar peace. We assume that it is a function of agreement strength,
s, and other covariates. It thus takes the following form:
log(T ) = s  + x↵ + ✏ (4.2)
where ✏ follows a log-Normal distribution,   is the e↵ect of agreement strength, x is
the vector of independent variables, and ↵ is the vector of coe cients.
As discussed above, I suspect that belligerents may want to sign stronger agree-
ments when they have a more fragile prospect for peace. This means that the part of
the agreement strength that is unaccounted for by independent variables, µ, will be
negatively correlated with the duration of postwar peace. Suppose, for example, the
disputants have an unusually fragile prospect for peace. Then, µ in equation (4.1)
will take an unusually high value, whereas ✏ in equation (4.2) will take an unusu-
ally low value. This means that, unless we account for this correlation between the
two error terms, we will underestimate   in equation (4.2), the e↵ect of agreement
strength, because part of the e↵ect of ✏ on T will be picked up by  . In other words,
we will incorrectly attribute to   the e↵ect of any part of ✏ that is correlated with µ.
To correct for such dependence between two processes, I construct a unified model
that jointly estimates equations (4.1) and (4.2). The joint model has the following
likelihood function:
L =
nY
i=1
S⇤i =siY
S⇤i =0
Pr(S⇤i = si \ Ti > t0i )Ai Pr(S⇤i = si \ Ti = ti)(1 Ai), (4.3)
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where Ai is the right-censoring indicator that takes the value of 1 when the observa-
tion is right-censored and 0 otherwise. To specify this likelihood function, we must
be able to characterize two joint distributions that appear in equation (4.3). The
challenge here is that it is not straightforward to write down a joint distribution of
two random variates that are of di↵erent distribution families (in our case, Poisson
and log-Normal). This is done by utilizing a copula function. A copula is a func-
tion that parameterizes the dependence between univariate marginal distributions to
form a joint distribution function (Trivedi & Zimmer 2005). Consider two random
variables x and y with associated univariate distribution functions Fx(·) and Fy(·).
Sklar’s (1959) theorem establishes that there exists a copula C(·, ·, ; ✓) such that a
bivariate joint distribution is defined for all x and y in the extended real line as
Fxy(x, y) ⌘ Pr(x < x⇤ \ y < y⇤) = C {Fx(x⇤), Fy(y⇤); ✓} (4.4)
where the association between the two marginal distributions is represented by the
association parameter, ✓. This result is remarkable because it shows we can construct
a new bivariate distribution based on univariate marginal distributions of known
form. As long as the univariate marginal distributions are known, an appropriate
choice of copula function C in (4.4) enables one to represent the unknown joint
distribution.
Then, the first component of the likelihood function, the probability that dis-
putants reach an agreement with strength si and then peace has not lasted until the
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right-censoring point, t0i , is obtained as
Pr(S⇤i = si \ Ti > t0i ) = Pr(S⇤i < si \ Ti > t0i )  Pr(S⇤i < si   1 \ Ti > t0i )
= Pr(S⇤i < si)  Pr(S⇤i < si \ Ti < t0i )
  ⇥Pr(S⇤i < si   1)  Pr(S⇤i < si   1 \ Ti < t0i )⇤
= Fs(si)  Fs(si   1)  C
 
Fs(si), Ft(t
0
i ); ✓
 
+ C
 
Fs(si   1), Ft(t0i ); ✓
 
where Fs is the Poisson distribution function that characterizes agreement strength,
and Ft is the distribution function that characterize postwar peace duration. Note
that, as the agreement strength is measured as integer values, Pr(S⇤ = si) is obtained
as Pr(S⇤ < si)  Pr(S⇤ < si   1).
The second component of (4.3), the probability that disputants reach an agree-
ment with strength si and then a next war recurs at ti is obtained by applying the
Bayes’ rule and taking derivatives of the joint distributions, as
Pr(S⇤i = si \ Ti = ti) = Pr(S < si \ Ti = ti)  Pr(S < si   1 \ Ti = ti)
= Pr(S < si|Ti = ti)⇥ ft(ti)  Pr(S < si   1|Ti = ti)⇥ ft(ti)
=

@C {Fs(si), Ft(ti); ✓}
@Ft(ti)
  @C {Fs(si   1), Ft(ti); ✓}
@Ft(ti)
 
⇥ ft(ti)
where ft is the density function for peace duration.
The last step to complete the derivation of the likelihood function (4.3) is to
choose a particular copula function, C(, ; ✓). There exist a number of di↵erent cop-
ula functions that we can use to characterize a multivariate distribution (Trivedi &
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Zimmer 2005), but some copulas are simpler and easier to handle than others, while
simpler copulas tend to be less flexible. For example, perhaps the simplest copula
function is the product copula that takes the following form: C(F (x), G(y); ✓) =
F (x) ⇤ G(y). This copula simply multiplies two marginal distribution functions to
generate a joint distribution, assuming that the two marginal distributions are inde-
pendent (✓ = 0). For another example, some copulas, such as the Clayton copula,
only allow positive correlation between the marginal distributions. In this paper,
I use the Gaussian copula function. This copula is one of the most flexible copula
functions that allow for both positive and negative dependency to the maximum
extent. It takes the following form
C(u, v; ✓) =
Z   1(u)
 1
Z   1(v)
 1
1
2⇡(1  ✓2)1/2 exp
 (s2   2✓st+ t2)
2(1  ✓2)
 
dsdt
where   1() is the Gaussian quantile function,  1 < ✓ < 1 is the association pa-
rameter, and u = Fx(x) and v = Fy(y) are the marginal distributions for random
variables x and y. I chose the Gaussian copula for a number of reasons. Although
taking a relatively simple form, the Gaussian copula is comprehensive, meaning that
it can fully accommodate perfect negative dependence (✓ =  1) and perfect positive
dependence (✓ = 1). Relatedly, the association parameter allows for independence as
a special case (✓ = 0). This allows us to test the existence of endogeneity by testing
whether ✓ is statistically distinguishable from 0.
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Figure 4.2 : Duration of post-war peace
(Notes. This figure shows the histogram of observed (i.e., non-censored) duration of peace following
interstate wars, 1914–2001. The horizontal axis shows the duration of peace until war recurrence
measured in years, and the height of the bars shows the number of war-dyads that have a given
duration.)
The Data
To estimate the likelihood function (4.3), this paper utilizes the dataset on post-
war peace duration and the strength of peace agreements originally developed by
Fortna (2003, 2004) and supplemented by Lo, Hashimoto & Reiter (2008). The
unit of observation in the dataset is a war-dyad, a pair of countries that fought
an interstate war against each other. The outcome variable measures the duration
of peace following wars that began from 1914 to 2001. There are 52 wars in the
dataset, involving 186 war-dyads. Among the 186 war-dayds, 54 “failures” of peace
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are observed. For the remaining 132 observations, post-war peace has not broken
down yet as of the end of 2001 and thus they are treated as right-censored. Figure
4.2 shows the distribution of observed duration of post-war peace for the 54 non-
right-censored cases. The vertical dashed line is drawn at the median (6.3 years).
We can see that more than a half of the “failures” (recurrence) occurred in less than
5 years, whereas some cases, mainly from the first world war, have recurred after
more than 20 years.
Table 4.1 : Agreement strength: Constituent variables and their measurements
Variable Name Measurement
Formalism 0 = no declared cease-fire, or tacit or informal acceptance of cease-fire
1 = formal acceptance of cease-fire proposal or agreement
Withdrawal of Forces 0 = none
1 = partial, to status quo ante, or beyond
Demilitarized Zones 0 = none
1 = demilitarized zone
Arms Control 0 = none
1 = arms embargo, limits near cease-fire line, specific weapons
prohibited
Peacekeeping 0 = none
.5 = monitoring (unarmed military observers)
1 = peacekeeping forces (armed)
External Involvement 0 = none
.5 = mediate cease-fire, restraint, patron, etc
1 = explicit or well-understood guarantee of peace
Paragraph Count 0 = 0 paragraph
1/3 = 1–20 paragraphs
2/3 = 21–80 paragraphs
1 = over 80 paragraphs
Internal Control 0 = none
.5 = stated responsibility for actions from own territory
1 = concrete measures to ensure control
Confidence Building Measures 0 = none
1 = military info exchanged, hot line, onsite or aerial verification
Dipute Resolution 0 = none
.5 = ongoing third-party mediation
1 = joint commission of belliegerents
Source: Fortna (2003, 2004).
Index of agreement strength is constructed by summing all these ten variables.
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Figure 4.3 : Agreement strength: Mean values of each constituent variable
(Notes. This figure shows the mean values of ten variables that comprise the index of agreement
strength.)
The key explanatory variable of this study is the strength of peace agreements
reached by war-dyads. Fortna (2003, 2004) operationalizes this variable as an index of
various mechanisms implemented, such as demilitarized zone, arms control measures,
peacekeeping force, etc., for a period of 1945–1998. In a subsequent study, Lo,
Hashimoto & Reiter (2008) expanded the time frame of the dataset for a period of
1919–2001 by using the same codebook developed by Fortna (2003, 2004). Overall,
the dataset contains information about 136 peace agreements, including cease-fire
agreements and follow-up agreements. Table 4.1 describes the measurement of the
ten mechanisms that comprise this index. Figure 4.3 presents mean values of each
variable. As there are ten constitutive variables, each of which varies from 0 to 1,
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the agreement index varies from 0 to 10. 1 Figure 4.6 in the Appendix shows the
histogram of agreement index.
Estimation of the likelihood function (4.3) requires two sets of independent vari-
ables, as shown in equations (4.1) and (4.2). The first set of independent variables, z
in equation (4.1), explain agreement strength. For this equation, I draw on Fortna’s
(2004) analysis of agreement strength and use the same independent variables in
her analysis. The second set of independent variables, x in equation (4.2), explain
the duration of postwar peace. For this equation, I use the same sets of independent
variables used in Lo, Hashimoto & Reiter’s (2008) analysis of peace duration in order
to make the results comparable with past studies.
Estimation Results
Table 4.2 reports the maximum likelihood estimates of coe cient parameters. It
shows five sets of coe cients from four di↵erent models. Estimates under the first
column are for the equation (4.1) explaining agreement strength as a Poisson process,
and those under the second to the fifth columns represent the parameter estimates
for the equation (4.2) explaining postwar peace duration as a Weibull process. As
the coe cients for the duration process are shown in the accelerated failure time
metric, positive estimates are associated with longer durations. Models 1 and 2
(under the second and the third columns) do not account for the endogeneity of
agreement strength by ignoring the equation (4.1), whereas models 3 and 4 (under
the fourth and the fifth columns) correct for the endogeneity by jointly estimating
1 In the actual estimation, the index is multiplied by 6 so that it takes only integer values. This
involves no loss of generality.
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equations (4.1) and (4.2). We can see that the estimated correlation between the
error terms in agreement strength and peace duration is negative in both models 3
and 4, suggesting that, all else equal, the disputants sign stronger agreements when
they face a fragile prospect for peace. This is consistent with my argument that
agreement strength is endogenous to the fragile prospect for peace.
Among the four models shown in Table 4.2, the main focus of this study is
model 4, as this is the one that truthfully captures my theoretical argument. I
report the results from the other models to facilitate a comparison between my
results and those from the past studies. The result reported in the second column
(Model 1) is essentially a replication of Lo, Hashimoto & Reiter (2008) using a
Weibull duration model. 2 The result under this column shows that agreement
strength does not matter if we ignore the endogeneity and assume that the e↵ect of
agreement strength is time constant. The second model includes an interaction term
between agreement strength and time, which allows the e↵ect of agreement strength
to vary over time. Nevertheless, the estimated e↵ect of agreement strength and its
time interaction are both statistically indistinguishable from zero. The third model
corrects the endogeneity, but forces the e↵ect to be constant over time.
2 Lo, Hashimoto & Reiter (2008) use a Cox semi-parametric model, which does not require
assumptions about the shape of the hazard. Although Cox model is more flexible, parametric
duration models, such as Weibull model, are more e cient when the distributional assumptions
are correct. I chose Weibull model based on specification tests. That said, specification choice
does not make much of a di↵erence in this particular application: the result shown in the
second column is substantively identical with the result from the Cox model reported in the
first column of Table 4.1 in Lo, Hashimoto & Reiter (2008).
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Table 4.2 : Models of agreement strength (Poisson) and postwar peace duration (Weibull)
Agreement Postwar Peace Duration
Strength Separate Estimation Joint Estimation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Agreement Strength 0.01  0.03  0.48  0.45**
(0.01) (0.09) (0.37) (0.04)
Agreement Strength ⇥ log(time) 0.01 0.03**
(0.01) (0.00)
Foreign-Imposed Regime Change  0.54** 115.96 117.34** 14.32** 6.60**
(0.12) (77.77) (56.88) (6.32) (3.12)
FIRC ⇥ log(time)  11.85  11.99**  1.87**  0.84**
(7.83) (5.80) (0.68) (0.33)
Change in Capabilities  0.35  0.32 2.43** 1.85**
(0.29) (0.28) (1.17) (0.59)
Battle Consistency 0.68 0.68 1.00** 0.20
(0.43) (0.46) (0.50) (0.18)
Interrupted War  0.04  0.02  0.84  0.01
(0.39) (0.35) (0.76) (0.28)
One Democracy  0.06  0.07 1.85** 0.38**
(0.33) (0.35) (0.52) (0.19)
Joint Democracy  7.22**  6.61**  11.84**  1.40
(2.92) (2.26) (2.68) (1.09)
Joint Democracy ⇥ log(time) 1.55** 1.43** 1.39** 0.19
(0.70) (0.47) (0.29) (0.12)
Tie  0.28**  0.70*  0.63 2.62** 1.14**
(0.07) (0.42) (0.47) (0.72) (0.29)
War Deaths 0.54** 0.22** 0.21* 0.69** 0.17**
(0.04) (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.05)
Conflict History 0.81**  0.35  0.34  0.64  0.32
(0.05) (0.45) (0.40) (0.76) (0.29)
Stakes  0.27**  0.87**  0.81*  2.30**  0.80**
(0.06) (0.36) (0.49) (0.52) (0.20)
Contiguity 0.01  7.15**  6.30*  8.30** 0.30
(0.02) (1.08) (3.46) (1.52) (0.79)
Contiguity ⇥ log(time) 0.71** 0.62 0.96**  0.01
(0.14) (0.40) (0.16) (0.08)
Multilateral War  15.15
(1304.10)
Balance of Power 0.26**
(0.04)
U.S. Belligerent  0.04
(0.07)
Constant  2.65** 9.35** 9.16** 20.53** 13.65**
(0.44) (0.90) (1.35) (2.08) (0.89)
log(p)  0.00 0.06  1.32**  0.47**
(0.20) (0.28) (0.14) (0.14)
athrho 0 0  0.72**  0.82**
(assumed) (assumed) (0.03) (0.02)
Log likelihood  18504.22  18503.86  18188.45  18141.76
AIC 37042.45 37043.72 36412.90 36321.51
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 186 subjects, 6368 observations. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05
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Since agreement strength is interacted with the natural log of analysis time in
the main model (model 4), the implied coe cient for agreement strength can vary
over time. More specifically, the implied coe cient for agreement strength at time
t is the sum of its linear coe cient ( 0.45) and the product of the natural log of
time t and the coe cient (0.03) for the interaction term. This means that, at time
0 (immediately after the war ends), the implied coe cient for agreement strength is
equal to the linear coe cient, but as time passes, the implied coe cient grows larger.
It is important to note, however, that, in multi-equation, non-linear statistical models
such as this model, a coe cient is not necessarily equal to the substantive e↵ect of the
variable on the outcome variable of interest. In fact, when the correlation between
multiple equations is not zero and an independent variable appears in more than one
equation, it is often the case that the magnitude, sign, and statistical significance
of the substantive e↵ect of the variable are di↵erent from its coe cient (Greene
2003, 783). Therefore, to illustrate the estimated impact of agreement strength on
postwar peace duration, I calculate the change in probabilities of continued peace
corresponding to a small change in agreement strength.
Figure 4.4 presents the estimated e↵ect of agreement strength on peace duration
over time obtained from Model 4. The horizontal axis shows time, measured in years,
and the vertical axis represents the increase in conditional probabilities of continued
peace at time t when we change the value of agreement strength from 2 to 3. The
solid curve shows the point estimate, and the gray shade around the curve shows the
95 % confidence intervals of the estimate. 3 As we can see, the confidence intervals
3 To obtain confidence intervals, I follow the approach proposed by King, Tomz & Wittenberg
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Estimated effect of agreement strength over time:
Agreement strength changes from 2 to 3
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Figure 4.4 : Substantive e↵ect of agreement strength
(Notes. This figure shows the estimated impact of agreement strength on postwar peace duration
from Model 4. The horizontal axis shows time after war, and the vertical axis shows the increase
in conditional probabilities of continued peace at time t corresponding to an increase in the value
of agreement strength from 2 to 3. The solid curve shows the point estimate, and the gray shade
around the curve shows the 95% confidence interval of the estimate.)
contain zero immediately after a war ends. This means that, immediately after a
(2000). Specifically, I first generate 1, 000 sets of model parameters by randomly drawing from
a multivariate Normal distribution characterized by the estimated parameter and the variance-
covariance matrix. I then calculate the conditional probabilities of peace survival for a given
agreement strength at a given time using the simulated parameters. The values of the control
variables are held constant at their median values. The 50th percentile values are the point
estimates, and the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile values are the lower and the upper bounds of
the 95% confidence interval.
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war ends, agreement strength has no statistically discernible e↵ect on postwar peace
duration. In less than a year after war, however, the e↵ect becomes statistically
significant. The improvement in the prospect for peace is substantively significant
as well. For example, a one unit increase in agreement strength (from 2 to 3) leads
to about 15 percentage point increase in the probability of continued peace one year
after war. This improvement translates into about 7-year longer peace after one year.
Figure 4.5 displays the results of the same calculation from four di↵erent models
shown in Table 4.2. The top two panels show the results for models that correct for
endogeneity, and the left two panels show the results for models where agreement
strength is allowed to have time-varying e↵ect. That is, the top-left panel corre-
sponds to Model 4, the top-right panel to Model 3, the bottom-left to Model 2, and
the bottom-right to Model 1. We can see that the e↵ect of agreement strength is es-
timated positive only in Model 4 that addresses both of the two inferential problems
I identified.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper provides a reassessment of the relationship between the strength of cease-
fire agreements and the duration of postwar peace. While past studies have provided
mixed support for the theoretical argument, this study identifies conditions under
which stronger agreements are likely to promote more durable peace. Specifically,
I theorize that agreement strength will have the anticipated positive e↵ect on the
prospect for peace only after a certain period of time has passed and the underly-
ing conditions have changed. The statistical results confirm this expectation: ex-
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Figure 4.5 : Comparison of results from four di↵erent models
(Notes. This figure shows the estimated e↵ects of agreement strength obtained from Models 1 to 4
in Table 4.2. The top two panels show the results from joint estimation that corrects endogeneity,
and the left two panels show the results from estimation where the e↵ect of agreement strength is
allowed to vary. The top-left panel replicates Figure 4.4, which is based on Model 4; the top-right
panel corresponds to Model 3, the bottom-left to Model 2, and the bottom-right to Model 1.)
belligerents who are able to reach stronger cease-fire agreements will nevertheless
experience precarious peace for up to a few years, but after this period is passed,
they will be able to maintain more durable peace than if they reach weaker agree-
ments. I have also shown evidence that agreement strength is endogenous to the
baseline prospect for peace. The negative and statistically significant estimate of
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the correlation parameter clearly indicates that the disputants tend to sign stronger
agreements when unobservable factors suggest to them that they will experience
shorter durations of peace. This finding is not only consistent with Fortna’s (2004)
argument but also provides additional support for her finding that observable corre-
lates of peace duration are associated with agreement strength. More importantly,
once we correct for the endogeneity appropriately, stronger cease-fire agreements are
indeed found to keep peace longer, but only after certain length of time.
The finding about the increasing e↵ect of agreement strength presents an interest-
ing contrast with the findings from conflict mediation research. Specifically, scholars
of conflict mediation have reported that the e↵ect of mediation tends to be short-
lived (Beardsley 2008, Gartner & Bercovitch 2006). That is, mediated conflicts are
less likely to recur in the short run, but more likely to recur in the long run. Beards-
ley (2008) argues that this is because third-party intermediaries sometimes pressure
the disputants to reach a cease-fire agreement even when the disputants have not
fully resolved the bargaining problem that had caused the outbreak of conflict in the
first place. Such “unnatural” cease-fire agreements may maintain peace as long as
the intermediaries are willing to enforce them, but third-parties often lose interests
soon after immediate violence is ceased. Future research on conflict management
should investigate the possibility that conflict mediation and well designed cease-fire
agreements can function in a complementary fashion.
The findings of this study have important implications for policy makers. First,
my results suggest that signing a stronger cease-fire agreement provides ex-belligerents
with a powerful tool to increase the prospect for peace after war. Second, the re-
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sults also point to a limitation in such measures. Specifically, although stronger
agreements lead to more stable peace in the long run, the first several months af-
ter war will actually see a greater risk of war recurrence in the presence of such
agreements. This means that the international community should pay a particu-
larly strong attention to the ex-belligerents that have managed to craft a promising
cease-fire agreement.
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4.6 Appendix: Descriptive Statistics
The main explanatory variable
136 peace agreements (Median = 2.67)
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Figure 4.6 : Histogram of agreement strength index
(Notes. This figure shows the histogram of agreement strength index. The horizontal axis shows
the value of the composite index of agreement strength, and the vertical axis shows the number of
peace agreements that have a given strength.)
The main explanatory variable of this study is the strength of cease-fire agree-
ments. This variable is originally coded by Fortna for the period between 1946 to
1997, and then later expanded by Lo, Hashimoto & Reiter (2008) using the same
codebook. The data set contains information on the contents of 136 peace agree-
ments signed by the members of the war-dyads. The agreement strength varies from
0 to 10, with 10 being the strongest agreement, and the median is 2.67. Figure 4.6
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shows the histogram of agreement strength index.
Control variables
Table 4.3 below shows the descriptive statistics of the control variables shown in
Table 4.2.
Table 4.3 : Descriptive statistics of control variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Foreign-Imposed Regime Change 0.165 0.371 0 1 6368
Change in Capabilities 0.1 0.226 0 4.463 6368
Battle Consistency 0.385 0.417 0 1 6368
Interrupted War 0.081 0.273 0 1 6368
One Democracy 0.703 0.457 0 1 6368
Joint Democracy 0.256 0.436 0 1 6368
Tie 0.084 0.278 0 1 6368
War Deaths 10.706 2.353 5.288 16.2 6368
Conflict History 0.156 0.235 0 1.6 6368
Stakes 0.589 0.492 0 1 6368
Contiguity 0.482 0.5 0 1 6368
Multilateral War 0.903 0.296 0 1 6368
Balance of Power 0.77 0.149 0.5 0.998 6368
U.S. Belligerent 0.07 0.254 0 1 6368
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